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FOREVIORD 
This module constitutes an integral part of the Main Comparative Report of the 
Science and Technology Poljcy Instruments (STPI) project, a large research effort that 
examines the design and implementation of science and technology policies in 10 develop-
ing countries (Appendixes l and 2). 
The STPI project generated a large number of reports, essays, and monographs 
covering a great variety of themes in science and technology for development. More than 
250 documents were produced by the country teams and the Field Coordinator's Office, 
and this proliferation posed rather difficult problems during the comparative phase of 
the project. It was decided that a Main Comparative Report, covering the substantive 
aspects of the research work of the country teams would be published, and that several 
monographs treating specific subjects would complement it. 
The Main Comparative Report is organized in three parts. The first consists 
of a short essay covering the main policy and research issues identified through the 
research, and the second contains the most relevant results of a comparative nature that 
were obtained in the project. These first two parts have been published by the Inter-
national Development Research Centre in a single volume in English, Spanish, and French 
(109e, l09s, and 109f). 
The third part of the Main Comparative Report consists of 12 modules containing 
material selected from the many reports produced during the STPI project. They provide 
the supporting material for the findings described and the assertions made in the first 
two parts of the Main Comparative Report. 
The modules were prepared by several consultants, and given the diversity of 
topics covered, the IDRC staff did not consider it desirable nor possible to impose a 
single format or structure for their preparation. The reader will find a diversity of 
styles and structures in the modules and will find that the selection of texts reflects 
the views of the consultant who compiled the module. However, the modules were prepared 
in close collaboratton with the Field Coordinator and were also submitted to a STPI 
editorial committee who ensured that they provided a representative sample of STPI 
material. They should be read in conjunction with the first two parts of the Main 
Comparative Report. 
Francisco R. Sagasti* 
Field Coordinator 
Science and Technology Policy 
Instruments (STPI) Project 
*Present address: Grupo Anal is is para el Desarrollo (GRADE), Apartado L. 18-5008, 
Miraflores, Lima 18, Peru. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increase in the supply of scientific and technological products - knowledge, 
services, trained personnel - requires that the science and technology policy should 
include both the creation of scientific and technological (S&T) capacity and its proper 
use. 
The emphasis to be put on either aspect will depend· on the stage of S&T develop-
ment in the country considered. Developed countries already have an established S&T 
infrastructure, and it would seem that the principal role of S&T policy is to put it to 
work according to national needs and objectives. This type of action may be called 
marginal, in contrast with structural action, which would be centrally relevant in 
developing countries such as Senegal and Ecuador where the S&T infrastructure is still 
to be built. Some countries are in an intermediate stage where policy should take care 
of both types of action. This is the case in the countries that have participated in 
the STPI Project; they may be classified in two general groups: 
(1) Countries with a S&T infrastructure still being developed (Brazil, Colombia, 
Egypt, Korea, Macedonia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela); here perhaps more emphasis should 
be placed on structural than on marginal aspects. 
(2) Countries with a fairly developed S&T infrastructure, which needs consolidation 
rather than important structural expansion and should be oriented toward national needs 
(Argentina and India). The emphasis should be on marginal aspects, although structural 
aspects are still important. 
The time horizon is longer in the structural case than in the marginal one. In 
countries with a weak S&T infrastructure, the greatest part of the total resources 
assigned to S&T would be devoted to investment, ideally in accordance with long-range needs 
and requirements, which usually do not clearly come out of a medium-range development 
plan. This plan, however, may be employed to give many useful indications for orienting 
the activities of an established S&T infrastructure. Policymaking in Brazil and India 
would exemplify such situations. 
Three types of instruments are to be explored in this module, and the experiences 
of the countries participating in the STPI Project will be brought to bear in the anal-
ysis. They are institution building, financing, and science and technology planning. The 
first refers to the way in which a science and technology infrastructure, and its com-
ponent institutions, are designed and developed. The second covers the use of financial 
instruments - principally special funds for scientific and technological development, 
and the national budget for scientific and technological activities - to allow for the 
structural and incremental growth of S&T capacity. The third considers the way in which 
policy objectives, resources, and activities may be woven into a coherent plan for the 
expansion of S&T capacity and for its proper utilization. 
Each of these instrument types will have a different impact, but there is com-
plementarity between them. S&T planning is perhaps the one that should be brought in 
last, when conditions exist for its successful application - conditions largely created 
through the action of the two other instruments - because it would not make sense to 
engage in a costly and time-consuming planning exercise if there is little previous 
development of an infrastructure and of financial mechanisms. 
INSTITUTION BUILDING 
The development of an institutional infrastructure for the scientific and 
technological system is a necessary condition for the development of science and tech-
nology in developing countries. As a former Director General of UNESCO has put it (1), 
"the scientifically advanced nations know well - and this is precisely the secret of 
their technological pre-eminence - that the social and economic benefits derived from 
oriented or applied research depend on the existence and efficiency of what is known as 
the country's "operational network" of scientific and technological research institutions." 
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This network of institutions is generally well developed in advanced countries, 
and therefore they have seldom dealt with it explicitly: planners i.n developed nations 
take the institutional structure for granted and address themselves to the problems of 
priorities or resource allocation. 
The fact that institutional structures are more developed in advanced countries 
has often led to the belief that developing countries should follow a strategy of imita-
tion in planning their institutional development. But such a strategy is likely to be 
inefficient and ultimately to fail (2). The reasons for this are fairly evident. First, 
the context and the environment in which institutions operate in a developed country are 
widely different from those prevailing in the developing ones, and there is no guarantee 
that the institutions will operate efficiently and contribute to development. Second, 
if they had the choice, developed countries would probably prefer in many cases to develop 
a different institutional structure than the ones that they presently have and that are 
being copied. Third, the particular social and historical conditions of the developing 
country may provide opportunities to develop new institutional patterns that are better 
suited to local conditions and that could eventually become a model for other countries, 
developing and developed. 
In developing countries the growth and evolution of institutions in the scientific 
and technological system have been slow. Research organizations, universities, research 
councils, and service organizations have lacked financial resources and qualified man-
power, and in some cases, particularly in Latin America, there has been little demand for 
the knowledge and services they produce. 
A well-organized institutional structure, particularly at the national level, 
cannot be developed from scratch in a short period of time. However inadequate, there 
is usually a core of institutions from which to begin building and designing the orga-
nizational fabric in developing countries. They should be examined critically, and 
changes and additions should be considered. Once proposals are implemented, they should 
be left to evolve without changing them again too soon. A certain lead time is required 
for the institutions to stabilize after introducing major modifications, and frequent 
radical changes may retard the development of the institutional structure. 
It is not possible to optimize an institutional design in the traditional sense. 
There is no set of criteria for identifying and generating optimal institutional designs, 
particularly for the scientific and technological system in developing countries. One 
possible strategy may be based on a "satisfying" approach in which minimal conditions 
are established for an acceptable institutional structure. To this may be added a second 
set of criteria based on the capability of the institutional design for adjusting to 
changes in the system or its environment. In this way institutions may comply with 
minimal standards ensuring acceptability, and they may acquire a capacity for adaptation, 
helping its survival in the frequently changing milieu of a developing country. 
There is no standard blueprint for the institutions that an efficient S&T infra-
structure should contain, but most people would agree that five different types of 
activities should be contemplated: 
(1) R&D, in universities, government institutions (general purpose, devoted to a 
problem area, mission oriented), industrial research institutes, and industry-level units 
and laboratories. 
(2) Supporting activities for R&D, such as information, computing, training, 
surveys of natural resources, etc. 
(3) Services for the technological needs of the productive and government sectors, 
such as consulting, engineering, diffusion and technical information, standards, mete-
orology, quality control, analyses, tests, trouble shooting, etc., as well as technical 
advice for policymaking, regulation of technology imports, etc. 
(4) Public S&T services, such as those provided by statistical offices, obser-
vatories, geographical and meteorological institutes, etc. 
(5) Policymaking for science and technology. 
An institution may carry out one or more of these activities. In developing 
countries the latter is usually the case because the size of the S&T infrastructure -
measured for instance by the number of scientists and engineers - is not large enough 
to allow for a great deal of specialization. Additionally, there may be complementarities 
in having the same institute carry out several types of activity; for instance, industrial 
6 
research institutes in developing countries tend to undertake testing, quality control, 
technical assistance, consulting, engineering, and training, in addition to R&D, and such 
activities may be more important at a certain time if industry requires them for its own 
technical development. 
Certain aspects of institution building in R&D institutes, which make up the 
heart of the S&T infrastructure, are examined next. Institution building requires first 
the installation of S&T capacity; this means the creation of new institutions, and the 
reinforcement of existing institutions by small piecemeal additions or by major expansion. 
The concern here is in the creation and the major expansion cases, in which structural 
rather than incremental growth of the S&T infrastructure takes place. In such cases in-
vestment projects are to be formulated, engineered, and implemented in such a way that 
results are optimal for society. 
The problem in many developing countries is still mainly structural: how to get 
S&T capacity installed. This has often taken place in a haphazard way, guided by intui-
tion, pressure groups, and the imitation of S&T development patterns elsewhere. However, 
it is possible to introduce some rationality into this process. 
Major fields in which new S&T capacity is to be installed, or existing capacity 
considerably reinforced, may be identified through a planning exercise that may be done 
concurrently with the preparation of an economic and social development plan. Long-term 
requirements may be compared with existing capacity to find out the areas where existing 
capacity should be strongly reinforced or new capacity created. 
It should be remembered, however, that decisions about the creation of new 
scientific and technological capacity should take into account a time horizon that goes 
beyond that of a 5-year planning period. When capacity is installed, resources are 
committed for investment, in persons and physical installations, which may require up to 
3 or 4 years before being completed. To this should be added a period of time, varying 
according to the nature of the field, during which the institution is consolidated and 
grows, acquiring new knowledge and experience, until it reaches a situation of maturity 
in which it can produce efficiently the type of outputs it was originally designed to 
produce. The period of installation and maturation may be long (for instance, the 
Metallurgical Laboratory of the Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina took about 10 years), 
and although in the meantime the developing institutions may provide new knowledge and 
services, much of its energies are tied up with its growth and the improvement of its 
intellectual quality. 
These considerations should be made explicit to policymakers so that they do not 
entertain expectations that cannot be satisfied in the short run. Investment in science 
is not like investment in industry or in the economic infrastructure, where outputs depend 
principally on physical assets and equipment, and where the human resources required to 
run new installations are usually obtained without much difficulty from the labour market 
and are able to do a good job after a relatively short period of training. In science, 
output depends principally on the number and quality of human resources, and to a lesser 
extent on buildings and equipment. It takes much time to develop human resources from 
the usual bachelor of science level with only a general type of training into the type of 
researcher who will produce good results. Moreover, a collection of mediocre scientists 
will only produce mediocre results, so an eye must be kept on scientific excellence. 
Scientific institutions, being basically made up of human beings, are fragile and vul-
nerable, and the record shows how easily such an institution may be destroyed through 
the loss of its top scientists as compared with the long time it has taken to build it up. 
A first task in S&T planning is the establishment of capacity in human and 
physical resources in fields that are considered to be of high priority. The planning of 
investment in S&T may be expressed in a set of investment projects chosen from a number 
of candidate projects to be gradually implemented over several years, according to the 
possibilities of allocating resources for such a purpose. Investment projects may include 
new S&T units or institutions, or structural expansion of existing units. 
The usual cost-benefit techniques are difficult to apply here. The benefits of 
producing knowledge are not easy to determine; on the other hand when an investment 
project in S&T is being considered it is usually not possible to define with precision 
the types of knowledge that will be produced when the investment matures, because this 
would involve knowing which research projects will be undertaken a given number of years 
hence. This double uncertainty would seem to preclude the use of a quantitative cost 
benefit approach. 
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To guide decisions in such a situation, the approach suggested by Araoz and 
Kamenetzky may perhaps be employed (3). This is a primarily qualitative approach, which 
may be applied by expert committees through a sequential mechanism. It looks at two main 
parameters, utility and efficiency, and suggests that the priority of an investment project 
in S&T will depend on its usefulness for the achievement of national objectives and on 
the expected efficiency in carrying out its activities. The evaluation of utility in 
investment projects in the applied sciences (installation of new capacity or structural 
expansion of already-existing capacity) should consider ho~/ desirable future scientific 
and technological work in the specific area promises to be. Thus. the projects should 
show relevance to national objectives, particularly those pertaining to social and 
economic development in the long run, and they should be installed to deal with problems 
in which there is an assurance that useful results may be forthcoming in the not-too-dis-
tant future; technological adventures should be discouraged and left for richer countries. 
In basic science, the country should attempt to cover a large part of the scien-
tific spectrum so that access is gained to what goes on in the scientific world and that 
a good level of education is imparted to young people. Normally, such a coverage of the 
scientific spectrum would be attained in ·institutions of higher education. If a survey 
of installed capacity in basic science shows large gaps in the coverage of that spectrum, 
there would be prima facie strong reasons for filling them, probably through the creation 
of professorships or university institutes in the missing areas (4). 
If the spectrum is adequately covered, there may be a need for reinforcing capa-
city in basic science in a certain field if this is necessary to produce scientific in-
puts that are required by an applied science. Such an investment would be justified 
through its indirect relevance to national objectives. A good example in Argentina is 
basic research in plant nutrition, important for agricultural research on the use of 
fertilizers and other related subjects. · 
As regards efficiency, investment projects should be carefully designed to 
assure that the conditions exist for a high level of efficiency in their future activities. 
Among the items that should be checked the following may be mentioned: the qualifications 
of the person who will lead the scientific group; the optimum size and structure of this 
group; a good program for training the scientists who are to be incorporated; adequate 
buildings and equipment, taking into account that the first priority is human resources; 
and last but not least an annual operating budget that will permit peace of mind and smooth 
operation at least during the maturation period. It is not worthwhile to set up a new 
group or institute in science and technology if conditions are not right for good 
scientific productivity. 
The problem is that the state of the art in the design of S&T institutions is not 
codified as in factory design, for example. No two S&T institutions are the same even 
when they deal with similar problems. Even though there are a number of rules of thumb 
that may be employed as guidelines, the design of such an institution is very much an art 
and not a science. The dangers of uncritically imitating institutions in developed 
countries - which may not function properly in the very different environment of a 
developing country - have already been mentioned. This applies both to the strictly 
productive areas of the institution - its laboratories, workships, information and docu-
mentation facilities, etc. - and to the management and organizational characteristics -
for instance, a contract research type of institute may not be appropriate in a country 
where industry has absolutely no tradition of demanding R&D. 
Building up S&T capacity is a gradual process that should be carefully planned 
many years ahead. Two observations may be made. First, the bottleneck for such an 
expansion lies in human resources, and this underlines the importance of good coordina-
tion between S&T policy and educational policy; it is desirable to produce able and 
creative scientists and engineers at home in strong academic institutions rather than to 
depend on training from overseas. Second, insistence on usefulness should not downplay 
the role of basic research. Basic research of a good level of excellence is crucial for 
producing competent researchers and professionals; it provides standards of quality for 
applied research, _it supplies applied research with much-needed inputs in the form of 
required new knowledge or just competent advice, and it opens a window to the outer world 
of science. Without the latter, local scientific acitivity may fall behind, unaware of 
new developments that are useful for its activities, or it may research topics already 
explored somewhere else. 
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The Experience of the STPI Countries 
The creation and development of S&T institutions took different forms in the 
various countries participating in the STPI Project, from a quasi-spontaneous process 
impelled by scientific groups, ministries, and interested productive units to a planned 
approach contemplated by national policy and included in national S&T plans. 
It is only in recent years that some of the countries have planned the develop-
ment of the.ir S&T infrastructure according to their national needs, and it cannot be said 
that this institution-building approach has crystalized into a recognizable methodology 
as yet, although very interesting elements are appearing. 
The two STPI countries with a fairly developed S&T infrastructure, Argentina and 
India, are examined first. Here, as already suggested, the main task of S&T policy and 
planning is to consolidate the existing capacity and put it to work according to national 
objectives. Institution building, however, remains important but does not occupy the 
central position as is the case in the other STPI countries below. 
The S&T system in Argentina grew piecemeal over the years, and there have been 
notable efforts in several areas of endeavour - principally the military institutions, 
industry, agric°ulture, and basic research - to shape subsystems properly in those areas. 
An example is the network of agricultural research stations and extension agencies of the 
powerful National Institute of Agrarian Technology, which over a period of 15 years since 
its foundation (1956) was able to cover thematically and geographically most of the field 
assigned ta· it. A more interesting case - and potentially one with very interesting 
implications for other developing countries - is that of the National Institute of 
Industrial Technology (INTI), which was created a research system that operates with 
great flexibility and can be expanded by incorporating already-existing capacity in 
universities, industry, and official institutions. INTI is an autonomous state institute 
with its own funding (a proportion of all loans to industry) that has a number of central 
laboratories in physics, chemistry, materials, and other areas that cut across industrial 
boundaries. In addition it is empowered to associate with other sponsors - industry, 
universities, state agencies - to constitute research centres dedicated to a certain 
field of application that will benefit industrial activity. These centres are not sub-
jected to state control, being nonprofit private institutions, but INTI is allowed to 
assign funds to them. Hence a vehicle has been found to build up industrial research 
institutions with state support yet without state red tape and excessive controls. More-
over, in several cases it has been possible to bring into a new centre the physical and 
human resources of universities that previously were not properly employed in R&D and 
other S&T activities, so that much of the recent growth of the INTI system has been 
achieved by incorporating already-existing S&T capacity that was not utilized properly, 
thereby giving it a mission and an injection of financial resources. There are more than 
20 research centres in the INTI system, in addition to a dozen central laboratories, 
making this a large, multipurpose industrial research institute with a good degree of 
flexibility and with an excellent mechanism for growth and diversification. 
In India, institutional development in S&T has been very important since inde-
pendence but, as happened in Argentina and other countries, it has taken place according 
to sectoral initiatives with little overall coordination. The 1974-1979 S&T plan was 
mainly concerned with how to put this capacity to work according to national needs, but 
it includes a section regarding the programs of the major scientific agencies, which in 
several cases include the creation of new S&T capacity in areas whose agencies have 
identified. This however does not constitute a coherent program for institutional 
development, but rather an aggregate of what agencies feel they need; it does not attempt 
to evaluate and integrate these requests or to identify and design institutions needed 
in areas still unattended. 
The Brazilian Plan mentions numerous areas where the creation of new institutions 
is proposed. This however is implicit in the Plan document; the very long list of new 
institutions has to be culled from the text, leaving the impression that such an important 
expansion of S&T capacity as is envisaged should perhaps be treated in a special section 
and eventually be subjected to a special effort of project formulation, evaluation, and 
implementation, with particular attention to funding aspects and to the relations with 
human resource development. Noteworthy among the programs for new S&T institutions in 
the Brazilian Plan is the one referring to "technological· complexes" that would integrate 
research centres, engineering firms, and high-technology industries, of which the first 
is now being formed in Rio de Janeiro around five technological institutes and the 
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National Laboratory of Metrology. This notion of concentrating institutions to provide 
critical mass, interactions, and other favourable effects is also present in the Korean 
science park and science town concept, and would seem to be worthy of further study. 
Peru and Korea are probably the only STPI countries where institution building 
has become an explicit national policy. In both cases the question has been how to create 
an infrastructure that would supply the pressing S&T needs of the rapidly developing 
economy. In Peru this has been done sectorally, perhaps with little overall coordination, 
and has brought into being new institutions in agriculture, industry, mining, communica-
tions, ocean resources, natural resources, etc. Whether it was better to allow each 
sector to have its own S&T applied capability, or whether a Korean-type solution should 
have been adopted with a few general·-purpose but sufficiently large institutions, is a 
matter for debate. The same solution may not apply to entirely different countries on 
account of historical factors, existing areas of influence, entrenched interests, and 
other circumstances where strong differences are bound to exist. It would however seem 
that the manner of institution building in Peru - and this may be applied to many other 
countries - may have drawbacks in the shape of units too small, atomized efforts, dif-
ficult coordination, and duplication of certain physical resources. Time will show 
whether this is so. In any case, the efforts made by the National Research Council for 
national planning and overall coordination have largely been unsuccessful so far. 
In Korea, on the other hand, institution building has produced a tightly-knit 
network of efficient S&T institutions - a seemingly powerful Ministry of Science and 
Technology, a graduate educational institute (KAIS), an information centre (KORSTIC), 
and four research centres (KIST, KAERI, KOI, ADO) to which five more research centres 
are to be added in the near future. There is a concentration in Seoul Science Park, and 
a new science town is envisaged, with the idea of creating the conditions for efficient 
and effective work in the scientific and educational institutions. It has to be re-
cognized that the conditions under which this institution building has taken place, and 
is now continuing, are rather exceptional because there has been very important technical 
and financial support from an advanced scientific power, the U.S., and on the other hand 
the new institutions could immediately recruit Korean scientists and technologists who 
were working abroad. Such conditions are not likely be obtained in other countries that 
wish to expand significantly their S&T capacity, but some lessons may nonetheless be 
derived from the Korean experience. 
ARGENTINA 
Institution Buildin in the Field of Technolo ical Research and Services for Industry: 
the National Institute of Industrial Technology 
The National Institute of Industrial Technology (INTI) of Argentina has developed 
a very interesting approach toward the building up of capacity for the provision of R&O 
and other S&T services to the various branches of industry in that country. 
INTI was created in 1957 as a decentralized organization in the Ministry of 
Industry, with the mission of providing technological backing for industrial development 
by rendering applied research and development both on its own initiative and on request. 
Over the years the institution was able to grow steadily and extend its scope to a large 
number of industrial branches. At present INTI has in its system some 250 scientists 
and engineers who work in almost 20,000 square miles of reasonably well-equipped labo-
ratories and installations. 
INTI's policy has stressed the efficient use of the nation's science and tech-
nology resources to avoid underutilization of equipment, unnecessary duplication of work, 
and other causes of inefficiency. This has led it to sign agreements with other large 
scientific institutions in the country with which collaboration is carried out in a 
variety of ways, and with various central and provincial goverMJent institutions to extend 
the range of its services to the different regions of the country. But, more important, 
such objectives are being fostered through the association of INTI and a variety of 
universities, scientific institutions, and government agencies in the research centres 
that make up INTI's network. This is equivalent to the important task of institution 
building, as is seen next. 
INTI is a decentralized organization of the government; it possesses its own 
funds, derived from a levy on loans to industry by two large national banks. Such 
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independent resources make it easier for the institution to prepare long-term plans than 
would be the case if its resources were allotted yearly in the national budget. This 
circumstance, however, is not enough to provide a favourable environment for scientific 
and technological activities, because, as is well known, government organizations have to 
comply with a large amount of red tape on account of budgetary and administrative pro-
cedures that have been designed for other types of activity. A solution to this problem 
has been found in that INTI is empowered by its charter to create research centres through 
agreements with other government institutions, universities, industrial associations, 
and private firms. The research centres are legally private, nonprofit institutions, 
although they are subjected to control by INTI and so they rightly belong to the official 
sphere. INTI may assign funds to the centres, but once this is done the funds can be 
disbursed by the latter without having to comply with certain cumbersome government 
administrative procedures. Thus, they enjoy great flexibility in the management of their 
resources, their personnel, etc. On the other hand, the association of industry in a 
specific centre provides a natural and strong link between scientific and technical 
activity and industrial firms, which favours the coupling of science and industry. 
INTI operates a network made up of several central laboratories and more than 
20 research centres. The central laboratories are engaged in research and technical 
assistance for industry as well as for government; they also provide support for the 
research centres. The latter deal with the various problems brought to than by the 
industrial branch they are serving, and engage in research, much of it under contract. 
Such an organizational setup means that single-purpose units are integrated into a multi-
purpose institution, at the same time preserving the close contacts of the former with 
industry and achieving a critical mass of personnel in various disciplines. This system 
shows several flexibilities that seem to make it especially suited for the tasks it faces: 
(1) The private nonprofit legal status of the research centres bypasses cumber-
some government administrative procedures. 
(2) INTI may sign contracts with government directly (without entering into a 
bid) and is empowered to channel the funds from such contracts to its research centres 
where the work will be undertaken. 
(3) New research centres may be set up very quickly by merely signing an agree-
ment between INTI and the interested parties. Existing centres may be easily dissolved 
when the reason for their existence has disappeared. 
(4) Temporary research centres may be set up to discharge a short-term task such 
as a feasibility study; once the job is done the temporary centre is dissolved. This 
allows INTI and other interested institutions to channel funds for such jobs in an easy 
way and to employ the best people during the period required. 
INTI research centres have frequently been created on the basis of requests by 
industrial associations or a number of firms in a branch. Costs are borne partly by INTI 
and partly by the sponsors, INTI's share varying between 20% and 85%. Sponsors may con-
tribute through payments in kind - equipment, materials, assignment of personnel, etc. 
They benefit from reduced rates in the technical assistance offered by the centre. An 
executive committee made up of representatives of INTI and the sponsors is responsible 
for the centre, but INTI reserves the right to approve the nomination of the director 
and staff; on the other hand the centre has to comply with the general policy guidelines 
of INTI in technical and administrative matters. 
Some centres have been set up in association with the universities and other 
scientific organizations. In such cases a very interesting feature appears. The 
university may contribute buildings, equipment, and personnel, which in fact means that a 
favourable habitat is found for existing scientific groups that may now devote themselves 
more purposely and steadily to industrial technology activities, under INTI's umbrella. 
In this way INTI nucleates scientific potential that would otherwise be rather dispersed 
and allows it to start a useful interaction with industry. In a similar vein, INTI has 
set up centres by agreement with public enterprises, with the same results. Moreover, 
multipurpose centres in different provinces may be formed by agreement between INTI, the 
provincial authorities, the local university, and the local productive system, nucleating 
the existing capacity in men, equipment, and buildings. Funds for the operation come 
from INTI and the other sponsors, and the activity is guided by general INTI policies, 
with due consideration for local practices and needs. The interesting thing about this 
is that INTI is acting as an organizer and to a certain extent as a funder and policy-
maker for hitherto disperse, unorganized scientific activity, thus leading toward a 
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countrywide network for research and technical services for industry that does not need 
the creation of new capacity but rather the organization and complementing of existing 
capacity. The experience is still too recent to permit an evaluation, but the prospects 
are promising, two such centers being now in operation. 
To sum up, INTI may be considered as a system comprising central administrative 
and policymaking bodies and a research network made up of (a) central laboratories, 
(b) industrial research centres that serve various branches of industry (single-purpose 
research centres), and (c) multipurpose regional technology institutes. The legal and 
structural characteristics of this system make it an efficient vehicle for building up 
a S&T infrastructure at the service of industry, both through better use of existing but 
unstructured S&T capacity and through the creation of new S&T capacity. 
INDIA 
Creation of New S&T Institutions in the S&T Plan( 6) 
Several new S&T institutions are to be created by the major scientific agencies 
in the S&T Plan period. 
(1) The Department of Science and Technology (DST) is designated to establish 
the following organizations: the National Information System for Science and Technology 
(NISSAT), the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC), the Cryogenic Corporation, 
the National Remote Sensing Agency (NRSA), the Ocean Science and Technology Agency (OSTA), 
and the Regional Sophisticated Instrumentation Centres. In addition, DST is to set up a 
Machinery and Equipment Development Corporation, an International Technology Transfer 
Centre (ITTC), and an electronics component manufacturing unit. 
(2) The major thrust of the R&D programs identified by the Department of Atomic 
Energy for implementation during the Fifth Plan is on the construction of a 100 MW 
thermal research reactor at Bombay and the development of a Reactor Research Centre (RRC) 
at Kalpakkam. The former is meant for the testing of fuel elements used in power 
reactors, material-testing programs and the production of radioisotopes. The facilities 
to be set up at the Reactor Research Centre are oriented to meet the power program re-
quirements based on thorium in the 1980s. R&D work on advanced thermal reactors and fast 
breeder reactors would be initiated. The primary facility at RRC is the fast breeder 
test reactor supported by a radio metallurgical laboratory, a radio chemical facility, 
a materials development laboratory, and related facilities. Nearly 70% of the outlay of 
the plan is accounted for by these two projects. Of the remainder, many of the schemes 
consist of extensions to the existing facilities at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre 
(BARC). New work is proposed to be undertaken in the fields of radio pharmaceuticals, 
radiation sterilization plutonium and uranium plant expansion, cobalt-handling facilities 
etc. 
Programs at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) envisage the con-
solidation of existing advanced research programs, the setting up of facilities like 
cosmic ray detecting array at Ooty, the enhancement of capabilities of the Ooty radio 
telescope, the construction of a new millimetre wave radio telescope, and the setting up 
of a computer network. 
(3) In electronics, the main R&D effort has been confined largely to government 
agencies such as Defence, CSIR, Atomic Energy, Communication, and Indian Telephone 
Industries. 
To take up extensive R&D work in various fields of electronic industry, a number 
of new laboratories in the fields of material science, microwave components and instru-
ments, broadcast and entertainment equipment, biomedical electronic equipment, radar 
equipment, industrial control instruments, computer and data handling systems, and elec-
tronic components have been proposed. 
(4) The Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) has proposed the expansion of 
a few institutions and the creation of some new ones; e.g. a clinical research institute 
for contraceptive technology, an institute for research in tuberculosis and chest 
diseases, a national institute of virology, an institute for research in cholera and 
gastroenteritis, and a cancer research institute. 
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BRAZIL 
Creation of New S&T Institutions in the S&T Plan(?) 
Brazil has a large network of S&T institutions covering many different disciplines, 
missions, and geographical regions. The country is interested in expanding and completing 
this network. The Second S&T Development Plan mentions the following instances in rela-
tion to the increase in S&T capacity for the support of industrial development (8): 
(l) Subsystem of Industrial Metrology: This includes several new laboratories 
to operate in connection with the newly established National Institute of Metrology. 
(2) Textiles: A system of laboratories will be created to verify the use of 
fibres and yarns in textile products, according to Law 5956/73. 
(3) Electrical Conductors: A system of laboratories will be created to verify 
the quality of electrical conductors made or distributed in Brazil. 
(4) Planning, Coordinating, and Setting Up Technological Complexes: Technological 
complexes are to be formed with centres for technology generation (public or private), 
government organizations, and engineering and high-technology industrial firms. Such 
complexes already exist in some cases such as air transport. equipment (CTA), communica-
tions materials and components (Ministry of Communications), and petroleum and petro-
chemicals (PETROBRAS/PETROQUISA). Priority is to be given to the Rio Technological 
Complex, where five technological institutions will be set up in addition to the National 
Laboratory of Metrology, for a total area of some 8 million square miles. 
(5) Industrial Design and Product Engineering: Activities in this field include 
the creation of the National Institute of Product Development and the training of spe-
cialists in industrial design and textile printing. 
(6) National Network of Metallurgical Technology: This network will be set up 
gradually by creating specialized technological centres in accordance with the needs of 
industry. 
(7) National Materials Centre: A National Centre in the field of materials tech-
nology is to be set up that will carry out R&D and application work in metals, polymers, 
ceramics, and other materials needed by industry - particularly that of electronic com-
ponents - and for which domestic raw materials are available. 
(8) Information System: This consists of the establishment of a system for 
scientific, technological, and industrial information especially oriented toward industrial 
needs, to be linked up with the System of Scientific and Technological Information that 
the National Research Council is to establish. 
(9) Laboratory of Magnetic Measures: This is to be created under the Navy's 
jurisdiction. 
(10) Centre of Mechanical Research: This is to be created for empirical and 
theoretical research in mechanics, including motors, mechanisms, propulsion, aerodynamics, 
resistance, and control; it is to come under the jurisdiction of the Army. 
(11) Aeronautical Certification: A technological infrastructure - human resources, 
installations, equipment, standards, procedures, etc. - is to be developed for verifying 
the quality and reliability of products, processes, and services in the aeronautical 
field. 
(12) Centre of Mineral Technology (CETEM): In the medium and long term, eight 
laboratories are to be installed for bench studies on ore dressing and extractive metal-
lurgy. These laboratories are to work in close touch with existing or new semipilot 
plants. 
(13) Laboratory of Minerals Research, Para: The existing laboratory is to be 
expanded. 
(14) Installation, or Expansion and Modernization, of Research Institutes: This 
consists of a program financed by the Inter American Development Bank, already underway, 
in which several important research institutes take part (IPT, USIMINAS, UNICAMP, UFSCAR, 
UnB, Rio Datacentro, IBGE, CETEM). 
(15) Centre for the Study of Fertilizers: An institution is to be created to 
support the Brazilian fertilizer industry through research, technical services, management 
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advice, and personnel training. The project is now being prepared. 
(16) Research in Industry: The Plan envisages strong government support for the 
establishment of research centres in the largest state enterprises or through industri-
alists' associations. 
PERU 
Creation of New S&T Institutions(9) 
S&T activities in Peru underwent an important expansion in the late 1960s. The 
state reinforced the existing infrastructure in the ministries and created a set of in-
stitutions for carrying out research in various fields of knowledge and areas of applica-
tion. The main new institutions were the Geophysical Institute, the Ocean Institute 
(IMARPE), the Office of Evaluation of Natural Resources (ONERN), the Institute of Agro-
Industrial Research, the Institute of Industrial Technological Research and Technical 
Standards (ITINTEC), the Institute of Mining Technological Research and Training 
(INCITEMI), and the Institute of Communications Research and Training (INCITEL). 
Important financial resources were allocated to these institutions, in many cases 
by way of autonomous funds. The most important one is that managed by ITINTEC, which is 
made up of 2% of the net income of industrial enterprises and is to be spent on R&D (and 
other S&T activities) in programs approved by ITINTEC. Similar funds have been estab-
lished in the case of mining, communications, and fishing. 
In their structure, mission, and activities these institutions respond to 
strategies that vary from sector to sector, and they deal with the characteristics and 
needs of their sector. In the case of industry, the policy of ITINTEC is to generate 
domestic demand for locally produced S&T inputs, particularly R&D, and to establish an 
internal R&D capacity in industrial enterprises. In communications and mining the central 
problem has been identified as that of training personnel outside the predominant foreign 
subsidiaries and using this personnel in R&D activities to create an independent Peruvian 
technical capability. In agriculture a network of experimental stations has been devel-
oped with close links to regional universities. 
In 1968 the Peruvian government created the National Research Council (CONI) as 
an institution in charge of coordinating research efforts and exerting leadership in 
national S&T planning. However, CONI has not been able to carry out activities success-
fully and has not had a significant impact on the country's S&T development. Whether 
this is a result of legal and institutional shortcomings, i.e. lack of means and re-
sources to influence behaviour, or of more general causes that would affect any in-
stitution of this type in Peru or elsewhere is a matter for further study and debate. 
~R~ 
Institution Building for the Promotion of Science and Technology(lO) 
Institution building in the last 10 years covers the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, nine research institutes, an educational institute, and an information centre. 
Of the nine research institutes, the physical research facilities of five are still to be 
completed. The scheduled completion date is 1981. The information centre and the Korea 
Atomic Energy Research Institute are included in this review because of their institu-
tional renovation in the last 10 years. 
Institution Building for the Administration of S&T: The establishment of the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) in 1967 marks a turning point of S&T promotion 
efforts in Korea. MOST has a wide range of activities - coordination and planning of S&T, 
manpower planning, technology development, information management, resources development, 
fostering research organizations, international cooperation, and atomic energy develop-
ment - which it carries out through two offices (Policy and Planning Management) and three 
bureaux (Development and Promotion, Atomic Energy, Technical Cooperation), and through 
its managing of several interministerial committees. In addition, MOST holds supervisory 
responsibility for the National Science Museum, the National Computer Centre, and the 
Central Meteorological Office, and it dispatches science attach~s abroad. 
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More recently a National Council for Science and Technology has been established. 
This is chaired by the Prime Minister and has as its members several Ministers as well as 
civilians nominated by the Prime Minister. This Council is in charge of assessing the 
national need for science and technology and guiding the national science and technology 
plan. 
Establishment of Research Institutes: The creation and development of several 
research institutes has been a major part of the government's efforts in the last 10 
years: the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), the Korea Advanced Insti-
tute of Science (KAIS), the Korea Development Institute (KDI), the Korea Atomic Energy 
Research Institute (KAERI), the Korea Scientific and Technological Information Centre 
(KORSTIC), and Hong Nung Machinery (ADD). 
The establishment of another set of institutes has been under way since 1972. 
Five research institutes and an educational institute are scheduled to be located in the 
Science Town near Daejon, which is expected to be completed in 1981. 
The Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) was established to help 
develop industry by carrying out research and development programs and providing the 
technical services needed by industry. KIST is responsible for: 
(1) Research, investigation, and examination, with respect to science and tech-
nology and engineering economics, and the dissemination of the results. 
(2) Cooperation with universities and other research organizations and pro-
fessional societies in and out of Korea. 
(3) Contracts for research and technical services or for such services performed 
by other organizations in and out of Korea. 
(4) Other supplementary activities to accomplish the objectives of the institute. 
Since its establishment in February 1966, KIST has undertaken more than 600 con-
tracted research projects worth approximately $8 million. Its staff, totaling about 250, 
has participated in government science and technology policymaking and has carried out 
industrial technology Eesearch. Although its main customers are government agencies and 
big industries, medium industries are now beginning to pay attention to the role of KIST. 
The preparatory work for the establishment of KIST dates back to 1961, when the 
Ministry of Education studied the feasibility of establishing a research institute. This 
was not implemented because of the excessive investment required. Other studies were 
carried out and finally President Park presented a proposal at the 1965 meeting with 
President Johnson. It was agreed to study this proposal under a joint-venture program. 
A team from the U.S. was sent to Korea and set forth the following principles: 
(1) The institute should be based on secure financial support derived from the 
Korean government and private industrial sources as well as from the U.S. government. 
(2) The institute should be an independent, nonprofit organization that would 
provide the requisite latitude for dedicated professional leadership and for flexibility 
in staffing as well as a budget sufficient to attract and retain the best Korean scien-
tists and engineers. 
(3) The institute should interact closely with Korean industries and should 
improve their efficiency and the utilization of Korean resources. It should provide a 
foundation for new industrial activities. 
Following the guiding principles, the team recommended the establishment of an 
institute for industrial technology and applied science in Korea with U.S. cooperation 
and support. Another study was conducted by the Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) to 
delineate the feasibility, corporate framework, scope, operation, and organization of 
the new institute. The total investment was estimated at $12 million in 5 years. 
Upon completion of the preparatory work in 1966, KIST was established as an 
integrated applied research institute in Korea, its autonomy and independent founding 
being overseen by a special law. 
After its inception KIST undertook a technoeconomic survey of Korean industries, 
with the cooperation of BMI. This survey was designed to analyze the status and the 
research needs of a large number of branches of industry. From the results of the survey 
the scope of KIST's research activities was determined. The following fields were 
emphasized for the inside research activities: 
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(1) Problems related to metallurgical materials. 
(2) Intensive development of the iron-and-steel-making, electronics, mechanical, 
and petrochemical industries. 
(3) Food production and food technology. 
Further refinement was required to establish the following fields of research: 
the material, mechanical, electronics, chemical, and food industries. In addition, the 
following fields were placed within the scope of research by the institute: industrial 
economics, construction, computers, technical information, material testing, and chemical 
analysis. Following the setting up of these fields of action, it was possible to estab-
lish research personnel, equipment, and facilities. The recruitment program served to 
repatriate Korean scientists and engineers residing abroad. It was fortunate that there 
was a large reservoir of qualified Korean scientists and engineers abroad. Steps were 
taken to assure that the research staff would have a good research environment, adequate 
and modern research equipment, and reasonable salaries, relocation expenses, and housing. 
Staff training was undertaken as soon as the principal researchers were recruited. 
The Battelle Memorial Research Institute, which has experience and tradition in the field 
of contract research, was selected as a training ground for senior researchers. Thirty-
four persons were trained at BMI in the 1966-1970 period. 
In 1971 an educational institute was added to Seoul Science Park. Having had 
about a year of preparatory work for its establishment, the Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science (KAIS) was formally founded to produce capable scientists and engineers. Faculty 
members of KAIS are expected to assume educational duties as well as basic research. KAIS 
is intended not only to meet the growing demand for applied scientists and engineers but 
to fill the fragmented and weak nature of the existing education in graduate engineering. 
Equipped with highly trained and competent faculties, it plays a leading role in active 
research and practical engineering education, which have been rare among existing educa-
tional institutions. 
To allocate the government budget and receive foreign aid, the government found 
it necessary to enact a law for the establishment of KAIS. This was accomplished in 1970 
a few months after a study on a new graduate school of applied science and technology 
was ordered by President Park. 
As was the case in the preparatory planning of KIST, a foreign study team was 
brought in to look into the status of Korean higher education and to aid in planning the 
future of KAIS. Emphasis was placed on continuing interplay between KAIS, the government, 
industry, and educational institutions to help the economy achieve its strength in inter-
national commerce. 
KAIS possesses a number of features unprecedented in educational institutes. 
(1) KAIS is exempt from the existing rigid educational law and regulation of public 
employees, thus giving it the freedom to pursue autonomy and financial stability. 
(2) KAIS has an endowment fund provided by the government. (3) KAIS has recruited highly 
qualified Korean-born faculty members from abroad .. (4) KAIS students receive generous 
financial support and are exempt from military duty. (5) KAIS has an independent self-
perpetuating board of trustees that exercises full responsibility for it. 
As of 1975, seven academic departments consisting of basic science, electrical 
engineering and electronics, mechanical engineering, and biological science formed the 
backbone of KAIS. In addition to regular academic courses for masters and doctorate 
degrees in science, KAIS conducts special programs and short courses for plant engineers 
and researchers. Judging from the initial academic programs of the seven departments, 
KAIS responds to industrial needs for engineers in manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
The government has granted approximately 2.2 billion won for land, buildings, 
and housing for the faculty and students. The U.S. government has also provided a long-
term development loan of $6 million through USAID for the initial procurement of teaching 
and research equipment and library materials and to provide a technical assistance 
program. 
The Korean government is financing an operational budget to cover the full cost 
of the KAIS operation. 
The establishment of the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAER!) dates 
back to 1956. Both U.S. aid and funds from the Korean government were provided for the 
establishment of KAER!. Through this research institute, over 200 engineers and 
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researchers were trained and supplied to the academic and industrial communities of the 
country. Because of organizational and operational restrictions inherent in government 
organizations, KAER! found it necessary to reform the organization to a nonprofit and 
independent research institute with a self-perpetuating board of trustees, along the 
lines of successful research institutes in Korea and abroad, and the administrative 
functions of the Office of Atomic Energy were transferred to the newly established Bureau 
of Atomic Energy at MOST. 
KAERI focuses its research activities on energy'and development, environmental 
protection and control, nuclear power technology, nuclear fuel technology, the use of 
radiation and radioisotopes, and life sciences and basic sciences (physics, chemistry, 
and biology). Because it is engaged in basic research, it has to rely on government 
grants for most of its operational budget. 
The establishment of an economic research institute was contemplated during the 
Second Five-Year Economic Development Plan. After a few years of preparatory study, a 
law was enacted in 1970 for the foundation of the Korean Development Institute (KDI). 
It was deemed necessary to have an economic research organization to conduct 
studies on eco_nomic policies and make recommendations to government. This kind of 
research activity is unsuitable for a private organization. KDI, therefore, has to 
resort to government grants to support its operational cost. To maintain qualified 
researchers and to continue research work, it is required to have a permanent organiza-
tion to perform these functions; KDI has to maintain an amenable research environment 
that is different from a college or a government organization. It also has to maintain 
impartiality and objectivity in assessing policy formulated by the government departments. 
KDI divides its field of research into financing, industrial policy, trade and 
economic growth, manpower and social welfare, international politics, and statistics and 
computation. 
U.S. aid and the Korean government granted 1.3 billion won to KDI for an endow-
ment fund. Additional U.S. funds of 1.75 million won were supplied to provide books, a 
computer, and printing facilities. Since the institute does not carry out contract re-
search for industry, operating expenses are covered by the returns on the endowment fund 
and by government grants. 
The Korean Scientific and Technical Information Centre (KORSTIC) specializes in 
information collection and retrieval for scientific and industrial communities. KORSTIC 
was preceded by the Korea Scientific Documentation Centre which was established with 
UNESCO assistance in 1962. The Documentation Centre was part of an earlier project to 
promote science and technology during the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan. 
To Expand its activities, operational support was shared by the Ministry of 
Education from 1964 to 1967. The supervisory agency of government was later turned over 
from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Science and Technology in 1967. KORSTIC 
performs the following functions: 
(1) Collection of technical information from domestic and international sources. 
(2) Classification, arrangement, and storage of collected information. 
(3) Dissemination of technical information at regular intervals and supply of 
information upon request. 
(4) Survey and study on the promotion of science and technology. 
(5) Technical consulting for small- and medium-scale industries. 
Hong Nung Machinery (ADD) is another research institute in Seoul Science Park. 
This organization is engaged in defence research. The need for more strategic tech-
nologies has increased as the Korean economy rapidly expanded, A single comprehensive 
research institute cannot meet this increasing need, and the Korean government has 
therefore launched an ambitious plan to establish a new Science Town in Dae Duk near the 
city of Taejon. Five new research institutes and a technical college are planned to 
open there and 12 existing research institutions are scheduled to be relocated. 
Two of the five research institutes, the Shipbuilding Research Institute and the 
Ocean Research and Development Institute, were founded in 1972. The remaining three 
research institutes will cover the areas of mechanical engineering, petroleum, and 
electronic communication. 
The total cost of the new institutions will be about $62 million. Once estab-
lished, the Science Town will have a population of 50,000 in an area of 5,720 acres. 
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The institutions will share facilities such as a library, a computer centre, workshops, 
and testing laboratories. It is hoped that many major industrial firms will take part 
in the Science Town project and open their research shops in the same area. 
Instruments of Institution Building: Law is the major instrument of institution 
building. The enactment of a law for a specific institute is instrumental in securing 
government funds. The following laws easily identify the respective institutes. 
(l) Government Organization Law 
(2) Regulation of Ministry of Science and Technology 
(3) Korea Scientific and Technical Information Centre Promotion Law 
(May 19, 1969) 
(4) Korea Institute of Science and Technology Promotion Law (December, 1967) 
(5) Korea Advanced Institute of Science Law (August 7, 1970) 
(6) Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute Law (January 15, 1973) 
(7) Korea Development Institute (December 31, 1970). 
New research institutes established in the last decade owe their existence to the 
understanding and forward-looking strategy of the government. A remarkably keen aware-
ness and perception by government leaders toward science and technology contributed to 
building a sizable research infrastructure in a comparatively short period. Efficient 
government actions were taken to draw up laws, help the institutions created, build 
physical facilities, and recruit research personnel. Furthermore, the government pro-
vided an endowment fund for financial stability and autonomy of research. 
In spite of the large government investment for building up the research insti-
tutes, the government turned control and management over to the institutes. This kind of 
arrangement is rare in the government organization. However, it was done for the sake of 
creating an environment favourable to research. In this context, the government has laid 
an irrevocable precedent to secure the autonomy and stability of a research institute. 
It is quite evident that the administrative branch of the government has taken 
the initiative in promoting a research institution. It was quite successful in persuading 
lawmakers to favour the enactment of promotion laws for individual institutions and to 
allocate a large portion of the budget for building up research institutions. 
It has been a common practice to draw upon foreign experts and financial aid. 
During the preparatory work, foreign consultants in research and management shared their 
experiences with Korean counterparts. A series of reports and recommendations made by 
the foreign consultants enriched and helped new institutes and set them in the right 
direction. In addition to the advisory task, foreign aid played the role of expediting 
the local commitment of funds. 
Impact of Institution Building: The impact of institution building could be both 
positive and negative. It seems that the positive impact may predominate: 
(l) In the case of MOST, the fact that a science and technology planning body is 
incorporated in the government at the ministerial level may mean that science and tech-
nology planning can command as much weight as other areas of planning such as the 
Economic Development Plan. It is thus expected that science and technology promotion pro-
grams can be treated in the same way as any other programs. It is also expected that 
MOST effectively manages interministerial coordination with respect to pertinent plans 
and programs related to science and technology. 
(2) The establishment of research institutes paved the way to gain momentum in 
the expansion of Korean research activities. The increase in qualified researchers in 
the last decade alone amounts to over l,000. Lack of research equipment and facilities 
used to be a problem for researchers, but this is no longer the case for researchers who 
are engaged at the new research institutes. 
(3) Large numbers of Korean students went abroad for a better education. An 
attempt was made to draw back Korean-born engineers and scientists residing abroad. The 
repatriation program was accepted by both the government and the individual research 
institutes, and it was very successful. Repatriation means the dual advantage of tech-
nology importation and of quickly satisfying the need for researchers in an appropriate 
field of research. The large number of employment opportunities provided at research 
institutes has had a reversing effect against the outflow of scientists and engineers 
abroad. 
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(4) The program of new institution building for research not only expanded the 
research capabilities in Korea but also avoided undue competition or duplication of re-
search activities by designating an institute to pursue a specific field of research. By 
doing so, an orderly division and specialization of research activities at the national 
level can easily be achieved. 
(5) The physical proximity of research institutes and supporting organizations 
renders further advantages. A better utilization of common equipment, research material, 
and technical information is accomplished by institutes in Seoul Science Park. It is 
becoming a common practice to make a pool of researchers in the Science Park available 
when needed by a multidisciplinary project. 
(6) Conventional research institutes and colleges that are not included in the 
government development program may suffer from a loss of qualified engineers and 
researchers. Imbalances between the new research institute under the government program 
and the conventional research organization may have an ever-worsening impact on the 
conventional research organization. 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PLANNING 
Introduction 
S&T planning attempts to tackle in a comprehensive fashion the building up of an 
S&T infrastructure in human resources and institutions, the optimal use of existing S&T 
capabilities, and the increase in the efficiency of S&T activities. This requires that 
priorities be specified in accordance with the development style and national needs, 
and the programs defined and carried out to attend them. 
The S&T planning experience of developed countries is only partially relevant 
for S&T planning in developing countries. In the former, planning is done principally 
to orient the use of installed S&T capacity in an environment that is ready and willing 
to apply new results (and where foreign technology imports are not an overwhelming 
influence on technical progress) so that it usually becomes the planning of R&D. In 
developing countries, S&T planning goes far beyond that and should also be concerned with 
building up a human resource base, creating and developing scientific institutions (in-
dustrial research units, information systems, consulting and engineering firms, etc.), 
and providing favourable conditions for R&D activity. The task in developing countries 
is therefore more complex and has to be done in a context of technological dependence, 
mistrust of locally generated knowledge, a scientific community oriented mostly to world 
science and not enough to internal needs, and a general scarcity of resources. It is 
clear that developing countries will have to find their own solutions in this field. 
The nature of S&T planning will vary according to the stage of development. If 
the country has already established an infrastructure of S&T institutions, resources, and 
activities, the problem is mainly that of reorienting and using effectively the existing 
capacity. Where that capacity does not exist, the planning process acquires a rather 
different character and should emphasize the training of human resources, the creation 
and development of institutions, the acquisition of physical facilities, the expansion 
of higher education, and the creation of policy mechanisms to promote science and tech-
nology. 
The process of S&T planning has usually required an organizational structure con-
sisting of a coordinating group with an executive secretariat, assisted by a number of 
technical committees made up of researchers, planners, and users of the results of S&T 
activities. The committees may be vertical, dealing with a particular sector, problem 
area, or discipline, or horizontal, cutting across these divisions and dealing with 
issues such as human resources, information, and policy instruments (11). Among the 
horizontal committees, some correspond roughly to the structure of public administration 
and others deal with special problem areas (energy, water resources, etc.) and with basic 
science, usually subdivided by discipline. The structure may involve several hundred 
participants. In fact, the implementation of the plan is helped if those in charge of 
carrying it out have been involved in all phases of the planning process. 
The committees may be given a high degree of autonomy to define strategies, 
priorities, resource allocation, and even specific projects from the beginning, limiting 
the role of the central group to one of assembling their proposals. In such a case the 
plan may easily consist of a collection of projects defined after hard bargaining among 
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committee members. Another approach would give the committees, under strong central 
guidance, the task of first defining a strategy for the sector, problem area, or disci-
pline of their competence and outlining areas of concentration and general priorities. 
After revision and integration of committee programs, specific research projects may be 
defined. 
S&T planning is not devoid of risks. It may be regarded merely as a technocratic 
exercise, unless it is backed by political will, funds, and an implementation scheme; 
even then the plan may be rejected by those who did not participate in its formulation. 
S&T planning is a young and rapidly evolving field, where experience is not abundant and 
conceptual approaches are still tentative. Perhaps developing countries should approach 
S&T planning cautiously, building up political support, consensus, and goodwill through a 
series of partial planning efforts in sectors where success is more likely, and gradually 
extending the scope to other sectors. 
Issues in S&T Planning 
Two main concerns emerge out of the experience of the STPI countries. The first 
is related to the problem of integrating technology considerations into development 
planning. Initially this may be considered as a by-product of economic planning exer-
cises, and the analyses of the Brazilian and Argentinian cases show that the role attri-
buted to S&T in the economic plans is largely implicit and somewhat marginal. 
The second concern is related to the planning of science and technology activ-
ities on their own, in some cases as a horizontal sector in economic development planning 
and, more frequently, as a separate planning exercise, with specific purposes and a longer 
time horizon. India, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil have produced comprehensive S&T 
plans, whereas Egypt and Colombia have limited such activities to certain sectors or 
problem areas. 
These two approaches - the introduction of technology considerations into develop-
ment planning, and the planning of S&T activities - may be integrated in a coherent way, 
as the Korean example shows regarding the attempt to interface development planning and 
S&T planning. 
The experience of the STPI countries, and the discussions at a special seminar 
on S&T planning held in May 1975, suggest a number of issues, which are surrmarized below 
(12): 
Decision Tools: S&T planning needs a mechanism for plan formulation and a 
methodology to guide decisions about the allocation of resources at different levels 
(global, sectoral, branch, program, project) and for different purposes (investment vs. 
current expenditure, R&D vs. other S&T activities, etc.). 
Quantitative analytical methods, such as those employed in economic planning, 
are only partially useful. It may be suggested that attention should be focused on 
formalized approaches that involve logical procedures and employ formal nonquantitative 
methods. Formalized approaches should not oversimplify the problem, but rather provide 
a framework for sequential decision-making, without reducing the inherent complexity of 
S&T phenomena. They may incorporate many different elements, such as the analysis of 
development styles and long-term trends, technological forecasting, relevance trees, 
boundary methods, Delphic techniques, matrix analyses, and, in general, formalized rules 
of thumb. 
The Context of S&T Planning: S&T planning faces many obstacles in developing 
countries because of unfavourable structures, contrasting interests, adverse effects of 
existing policies, etc. Under these circumstances planning becomes a political process 
rather than a technical one, and it is important to attain a consensus among interested 
groups. A wide participatory mechanism for plan formulation becomes necessary, and a 
measure of gradualism is convenient to gain allies, learn the business of planning, and 
produce demonstration effects that will open the way to wider and more complex planning 
attempts. 
The Approach to S&T Planning: This should ideally combine two strands, one that 
starts at the top and formulates programs to be undertaken by S&T institutions, and 
another that proceeds empirically, integrating into a plan what the institutions are doing, 
but with some reorientation plus a number of new programs. Once again, this calls for a 
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participatory mechanism in plan formulation. 
The Information Base for S&T Planning: The formulation of a S&T plan requires a 
vast amount of information. A good part of it may come from existing statistical systems 
(education, economics), from special surveys (for instance, of the S&T system), and from 
ad hoc studies. This information is particularly useful for the preparation of a policy 
frame and of rough guidelines for the planning exercise. But a large part of the infor-
mation needed in the actual formulation and in the detailed design of programs and activ-
ities can only be elicited from the many persons and institutions in governnent, science, 
technology, and production who have the specific knowledge and the relevant experience. 
Hence the mechanism used to organize their participation is of utmost importance, and 
purely technocratic planning exercises prepared by a few persons in a science ministry 
or council are not satisfactory. 
Institutional Aspects of S&T Planning: S&T planning should pay particular atten-
tion to the creation, reinforcement, and good functioning of institutions that perform 
S&T activities, taking into account that it is not enough to create an institution: it 
becomes necessary to continue supporting it during the time it develops, until it 
acquires maturity. 
On the other hand, institutions concerned with S&T policy and planning should be 
integrated into some sort of a "system", possibly under the leadership of the S&T planning 
agency or some other top-level organization, if planning is to be coherent and draw a 
wide consensus. 
Implementation of the S&T Plan: Among the principal mechanisms for plan implemen-
tation, the central fund and the national S&T budget may be mentioned. Attention should 
also be paid to the monitoring of S&T activities within the productive sector - including 
those that take place in connection with technology imports - and to the periodic review 
and reformulation of the S&T plan. 
Human Resources Planning Aspects: The main issue here is how fast the stock of 
qualified scientists and engineers can grow, because this would put an upper limit on 
the expansion of S&T activities. There is little information on this matter, but it would 
seem that very few countries have been able to double their stock in a period of less 
than 10 years, which is equivalent to about 7% growth per annum. In the short run, growth 
can be faster because human resources can be redeployed and personnel can be imported, 
but in the long run, expansion will depend on the output of the educational system, and 
this must be looked into if realistic and attainable targets are to be established. 
Special attention should be given to the attitudes and behaviour of scientists 
and researchers who may find it difficult to switch from activities oriented toward the 
international scientific community to those oriented toward the solution of national 
problems. 
Diffusion of Science Throughout Society: If science and technology are to 
become a true part of the development effort, a receptive audience should be created in 
various societal groups - government, entrepreneurs, labour unions, students, intellec-
tuals, and the general public. Diffusion campaigns and science education would be the 
principal instruments. In addition, the subjects of science policy and technology manage-
ment should be introduced in scientific and technical undergraduate courses, particularly 
in engineering, business management, and government administration, because graduates 
in these disciplines may later become important customers of local S&T activities. 
The Experience of the STPI Countries 
ARGENTINA 
The Technological Content of the Three-Year Plan, 1974-77 
If a general conclusion may be reached concerning the technological content of 
the Three-Year Plan, it would be that the implicit technology policy content arising 
from the desired aims, and even more from the objectives, is richer and more complete 
than the explicit technological content of specific policies and measures proposed for 
this area. 
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The mere proposal to obtain a high rate of growth and to modify patterns of 
consumption without changing the basic features of the capitalist system implies the need 
for a creative effort of hitherto unknown proportions; it would also require the modifi-
cation of one of the central variables of a capitalist system - technology - in such form 
that the balance thereof remains steady. 
However, it is doubtful whether the goals of redistribution of income, full em-
ployment, regional balance, the fostering of national capital, and the reconversion of 
the small and medium-size firm can be made compatible with the chosen pattern of growth 
based on a large flow of investments in sectors referred to as basic, and the doubling 
of the volume of exports, together with a substantial increase in the productivity of 
factors. 
Experience shows that efforts to achieve speedy capitalization as a means of 
attaining a high rate of growth in a short period of time are apt to condition the 
structure of production for many years. But if economic growth is a short-term economic 
necessity, it is necessary to provide the mechanisms for a progressive change at the same 
time that speedy capitalization is attempted in order that proposals of structural 
changes may be fulfilled. And one of the basic mechanisms for this is the scientific 
and technological creative ability (and therefore the ability to decide), which, while 
allowing the greater dependence arising from the process of capitalization to be pro-
gressively reduced, ensures that future capital stocks will progressively include 
national technology. 
Paradoxically, processes such as are proposed in the Plan may provide the 
financial and institutional bases for the attainment of this ability, because the large 
flow of investments allows the inclusion of provisions concerning scientific and tech-
nological creation without greatly affecting the total investment conduct. Furthermore, 
political aspiration to attain this goal does exist. 
It must, however, be stated that the concrete proposals contained in the Plan 
concerning the implementation of a scientific and technological policy leading to the 
attainment of the global objectives are clearly insufficient. 
The most notable lack is that of precise sectoral definitions concerning the 
scientific and technological needs to be fulfilled during the course of the Plan, both 
the existing ones and those which may arise from the investment process. The Plan also 
fails to propose specific changes in the nature of the generation of scientific know-
ledge: guidelines for the organization of institutions, standards for the allocation 
of resources, relationships with potential users, etc. These will, apparently, not be 
taken into account in view of the lack of a specific science and technology plan. 
Perhaps one of the principal reasons for the very marginal role of the scientific 
and technological factor in the development model proposed in the Plan lies in the 
planning process itself. Technology is introduced from the outside almost as if it were 
a ''patch" inserted in the process. 
This would show that the technological implications of global aims are ignored, 
precisely because of the failure to carry out the necessary basic studies. Briefly, the 
planning process consists of defining the way to achieve a balanced growth, based on a 
preexistent input-output matrix and starting from detennined general restrictions of a 
political nature (desirable external debt, level of employment, distribution of income, 
etc.), which do not include the technological needs that may be implicit in global and 
sectoral alternatives. 
The Argentinian Three-Year Plan does not escape this general rule~ although in 
this case ambitious proposals are included concerning science and technology. 
Reference must be made to the role that the Plan ascribes to the state as one of 
the main elements for the attainment of the proposed changes. This position implies 
that the state has the technical capacity to search for technological alternatives, to 
interact with its environment, or even to develop original technological answers to the 
problems posed by an accelerated process of growth. This is not the case in Argentina, 
where - with very few exceptions - the state has proven its very limited possibilities, 
despite the huge amount of resources it manages. But the most crucial point, which can 
now be observed in perspective, is the belief, shared by the national bourgeoisie, that 
there was a possibility of reorienting the activities of the state to use its power as a 
tool for political ends. For this purpose the Corporation of State Enterprises was 
created as one of the main instruments to implement the Plan in this sense. 
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Once the national bourgeoisie had lost its political power in early 1975, not 
only did the Corporation practically disappear, but all the measures taken concerning 
the technological behaviour of the state enterprises vanished and the latter returned to 
their traditional passive and dependent behaviour. 
BRAZIL 
Science and Technology i.n Brazilian Development Plans, 1956-73 
The following plans are examined: 
- The Target Program, 1956-60 
- The Three-Year Plan, 1963-65 
- The Program of Economic Action, 1964-66 (PAEG) 
- The Strategic Development Program, 1968-70 (PED) 
- The Targets and Bases for Government Action, 1970-71 
- The First National Development Plan, 1972-74 (I-PND) 
References are also made to the Basic Plan for S&T Development (PBDCT), 1973-76. 
A distinction is made between two types of S&T policy. Two alternative objectives 
may be considered, if technological dependence is taken as the criterion of differentia-
tion: 
(l) A policy of response: to answer the technological needs of the productive 
system by speeding up the incorporation and diffusion of innovations within the system, 
but indifferent to the option between domestic production and the importation of tech-
nology; 
(2) A policy of relative autonomy: to reduce the utilization of technology from 
abroad through the enlargement of the national capacity for the creation, adaptation, or 
incorporation of technical knowledge. 
The Target Program and the PAEG, although not presenting an explicit policy of 
science and technology, contain implicit answers to the technological needs corresponding 
to the respective stages in the process of industrialization, besides proposing diffuse 
measures and initiatives in the field of science and technology. This would be a policy 
of response, aimed at assuring the supply of technology required by the productive system 
on the basis of the contribution of foreign know-how. Such a policy corresponded to the 
proposition of opening the economy to foreign countries and of deepening the links that 
connected the country to the world economic centres. 
The Three-Year Plan similarly does not include an explicit S&T policy. Although 
its economic strategy showed the need for a vigorous and autonomous S&T policy, it pro-
posed actions that were insufficient for defining an alternative scheme to replace the 
foreign sources of technology and thus support the changes intended in the form in which 
the country is inserted into the world economic system. 
The Strategic Development Program (PED) for the first time defined an explicit 
policy for science and technology, presenting also a program of action that, in its 
basic aspects, reappeared in the following plans - Targets and Bases for Government Action 
and the First National Development Plan. The policy proposed in those plans can be 
characterized as a policy of autonomy, because it included among its objectives the 
country's qualification for the adaptation and creation of technology to reduce the 
dependence on foreign sources of know-how. 
In the case of the PED, such an orientation aimed at the development of technol-
ogies more adjusted to the country's endowment of productive factors to assure a larger 
labour absorption. This directive was articulated in the preoccupation expressed in the 
PED with the creation of a mass market as a means of assuring self-sustained growth. It 
should be observed, however, that this preoccupation was absent from the economic policy 
effectively implemented in the period, and that the evolution of the Brazilian economy 
reflects the failure of this policy of enlargement of the domestic market by the in-
corporation of strata with less purchasing power. 
The same preoccupation was also left aside by the scientific and technological 
policy proposed in the I-PND (and expressed in detail in the PBDCT), which, while also 
aimed at lowering the dependence on foreign know-how, linked this directive to the 
objectives of strengthening Brazilian industry's competitive power and strengthening 
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the national enterprise. But the increase in Brazilian industry's competitive power did 
not justify by itself the directive of promoting the country's greater qualification for 
the creation and adaptation of technology, because the technical knowledge that should be 
incorporated continuously by the productive system to reach that aim could be supplied by 
foreign sources, either through the participation of foreign enterprises or through the 
mere importation of technology. In this sense, that directive only appears as a necessity 
when linked to the proposition of strengthening the national enterprises and assuring 
their participation in the process of economic growth in Brazil. 
Despite the government initiative of supporting the national enterprises, the 
strengthening of such enterprises was not the dominant preoccupation of the economic 
policy of the period; it was directed above all to the maintenance of a high growth rate. 
In the same way, the solutions to the technological problems linked to the growth process 
that were implicit in the chief instruments and measures of economic policy aimed above 
all at assuring the flow of transfer of technology, thus characterizing it as a policy of 
response. 
The evolution of the Brazilian economy in recent years shows that the measures 
of support to the national enterprises were. in a certain way counteracted by the greater 
dynamism of the multinational enterprises in a context in which the most important in-
centives offered to the private sector - the subsidy for capital formation in industry 
and the encouragement of exports - benefited national and foreign enterprises equally. 
On the other hand, the position bf the national enterprises was effectively strengthened 
in those sectors in which government action took specific forms and mobilized more con-
crete instruments. 
From this viewpoint, it ~hould be stressed that, although the adoption of an 
adequate policy of science and technology is one of the factors that makes a certain 
pattern of economic growth feasible, government action in the sphere of science and 
technology is not by itself capable of determining this pattern. And this is so because 
the efficiency of a scientific and technological policy depends on its degree of con-
vergence with the natural evolution of the economic system and/or with the economic 
policy in force, as well as on the support it receives from the other policy measures 
and instruments. 
COLOMBIA 
The S&T Planning Experience 
The following general observations can be made on S&T planning in Colombia: 
(1) The explicit government policies on S&T development at a global level have 
been basically limited to the creation of various institutions concerned with the planning 
of S&T development or some specific aspect of it. This effort has not been translated 
into a national policy or a national development plan explicitly formulated in this 
field. Despite the institutional framework that has been created, no operational mech-
anism through which such a policy (or plan) may be formulated or implemented has been 
clearly defined. 
(2) At the sectoral level important government research centres exist to which 
funds are allocated directly through their respective ministries. Jhe fact that these 
institutes invest considerable amounts of money in research in their fields implies that 
they are formulating and implementing a policy with respect to research in each sector. 
That is to say, a series of sectoral policies of research exist in Colombia, at least in 
those sectors where there are important research centres. The level at which structuring 
and formalizing such policies takes place may vary from case to case. Moreover, these 
policies are usually not explicitly formulated. It would be interesting to analyze in 
greater detail the level of formulization of the sectoral policies and the proof that was 
used in their formulation. 
(3) As a consequence of the previous point, two complementary aspects should be 
mentioned: 
When formulating an S&T policy at a national or global level, account must be 
taken of the fact that most research activities of the public sector are carried out in 
research centres at a sectoral level, according to the policies established by each 
institution. The existence of these sectoral policies cannot be ignored, although in 
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most cases they have not been explicitly fonnulated but are resultant policies that 
emerge from the allocation of funds to ongoing research projects, among other things. 
This raises the problem of the relationship and coordination between those institutions 
responsible for fonnulating a S&T policy at the national level and the large research 
centres at the sectoral level. Furthermore, it implies that research priorities defined 
at the national or central level will have to follow a gradual path of successive· approx-
imations through which the priorities defined by the research centres themselves are 
gradually made more consistent with the priorities defined by the policy-formulating 
institutions. 
As mentioned before, the allocation of funds to these research centres is made 
directly through the budgets of each sector or ministry, not through any coordinating 
mechanism that allocates public financial resources to technological research and develop-
ment activities. This dispersion ·of the government's procedure in the allocation of 
funds to research activities represents an obstacle to the formulation and implementation 
of a truly integrated national S&T policy. Therefore, it is suggested that a coordinating 
body be created at the national level to advise the government on the allocation and 
distribution of these funds. This could be done through the creation of a National 
Budget for Science and Technology, in which the different appropriations to these activ-
ities in the various sectoral budgets could be clearly contemplated and analyzed. Prob-
ably this could involve the establishment of an interinstitutional body composed of 
various ministries, the National Planning Department, and others. This body would have 
to establish close relationships with those responsible for structuring the National 
Budget for S&T. 
(4) Two groups of institutions in Columbia reflect, in the initial phase of their 
activities, two different views on the nature of scientific and technological development. 
CDLCIENCIAS made an initial effort in relation to S&T development that was 
oriented toward strengthening the internal infrastructure in this field; it limited 
itself to a large extent to the scientific view. As it became conscious of the com-
plexity of the process, COLCIENCIAS expanded its activities, becoming one of the first 
advocates of the integrated view with respect to scientific and technological develop-
ment. However, as an isolated institution, it is limited in its possibilities of for-
mulating and applying an approach of this magnitude. 
On the other hand, the second group of institutions has tended to limit its 
activities to those economic problems related to the commercialization of technology 
(following the economic view). Many of these institutions were created basically to 
attempt to solve problems created by foreign commerce, foreign investment, the balance 
of payments, and the scarcity of foreign currency. Since their scope was limited to 
these purely economic matters, these institutions did not deal directly with the problem 
of a national technological policy. As they have become more aware of the importance of 
the multiple aspects of technological development, these aspects have gained a greater 
importance in the functioning of these institutions. 
(5) The difference between the two groups of institutions is reflected in their 
position in the administration framework. Whereas COLCIENCIAS has the principal ties 
with the National Council for Science and Technology (CONCYT), the organizations of the 
second group are more directly associated with the National Council for Economic and 
Social Policies (CONPES), the highest planning institution in Colombia. Since CONCYT 
has only had two meetings since it was created, it is difficult to judge the effective-
ness of the division between these two national councils. However, the following general 
observations can be made: 
CONPES is responsible for developing general economic policy, or implicit 
policies. These may well be more important than the explicit policies in detennining 
the scientific technological development of the country. 
In a similar manner, CONPES intervenes in specific decisions on important 
sectoral projects. It is precisely through these projects that science and technology 
are integrated in the economic development process, and that the principal technological 
decisions orienting national development in this field are taken. 
If one accepts the integrated view of scientific and technological development, 
it is necessary to achieve a greater degree of interrelation between scientific and 
technological planning, on the one hand, and economic development planning on the other. 
Taking into consideration these observations, two alternatives arise. The first is to 
encourage greater participation by the institutions of the second group in CONCYT and a 
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greater coordination of the latter with CONPES, for the purpose of integrating the S&T 
planning system. The second alternative is to reevaluate the rationality of the parallel 
existence of these two national councils. 
(6) In the previous sections the complexity of the S&T development process has 
been analyzed, along with the multiplicity of institutions that have to do with the for-
mulation and implementation of a national policy in this field. This responsibility is 
obviously too complex to be assumed by any single institution. On the contrary, one must 
think in terms of the structuring and coordination of an institutional network made up by 
the principal organizations that take part in making the basic decisions that orient the 
scientific and technological development of the country. At pointed out above, such an 
institutional network has gradually been emerging in Colombia, given the fact that 
several of the institutions involved participate in committees of an interinstitutional 
nature (e.g., Royalties Committee) or as a consequence of initiatives for interinstitu-
tional meetings and projects that have often arisen through personal and informal con-
tacts between the people who work in the various organizations. The function of this 
informal network can be carried out at the level of personal relations or small joint 
projects between various institutions and can be of vital importance in the progressive 
integration of the S&T planning system. This factor may even be more important than the 
simple bureaucratic administrative definition of a planning system in this field. The 
main weakness of these informal networks is their vulnerability to personnel turnover. 
EGYPT 
The Experience in Science and Technology Planning 
A number of policymaking bodies for S&T have been created over the last 25 years 
in Egypt: the National Research Council, 1948; the Science Council, 1956; the Ministry 
of Scientific Research, 1961; the Council for Promotion of Scientific Research, 1964; 
the Council for Scientific Research (superseding the Ministry), 1965; the Ministry 
again, 1968; the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, 1971; and again the 
Ministry of Scientific Research and Atomic Energy, 1975, although in principle the 
Academy structure was being kept for planning and coordination at a national level. 
The effectiveness of these national policymaking bodies has been deeply hampered 
by the many changes that took place, the instability of policy, the inadequacy of the 
infrastructure, qualified personnel, and physical resources, the shortage of funds, the 
lack of evaluation and follow-up practices, the dominance of the university ideology 
(which stamped most of the research activity with academic attitudes rather than catering 
to the needs of the development plans), the isolation of the scientific community, the 
separation between the sectors of research and socioeconomic planning, and the shortage 
of managerial capabilities. 
Two major attempts at S&T planning have taken place in Egypt and will be briefly 
reviewed. 
The Science Council Effort 1958-60 : The general atmosphere that prevailed in 
the country after 1956 post-Suez war led to the acceptance of the idea of planning in 
science in 1958, although with great pains and opposition. However, the Science Council 
finally adopted a 5-year plan for scientific research (1960-1964), which coincided with 
the first plan for national development. It was guided by three main principles: 
(a) Surveying and assessing the potentialities of existing resources; 
(b) Recruiting human resources for present and future development; 
(c) Drawing up effective programs for immediate and long-term needs, mainly 
depending on the state projects for national development. 
Work started in 1958 and was divided into six areas: mathematical and physical 
sciences; chemistry and chemical industry; geology and mining; engineering and engineering 
industries; agricultural and biological sciences; and medical sciences. 
The technical secretariat of the Science Council prepared detailed reports based 
on available data concerning personnel, institutions, laboratories, and topics of current 
research. It also prepared reports on various agricultural and industrial projects in 
the state development plan, indicating topics of research studies (or scientific content) 
associated with these projects. 
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One hundred and seventeen topics with a bearing on the national economy and on 
scientific progress were selected. A total of 170 experts were commissioned to write 
detailed reports that reviewed ongoing work, institutions, human and physical resources, 
world trends, relevant foreign institutions, etc. After coordination of the various 
reports, 58 planning conferences were held, attended by about 3000 scientists, and 
recommendations were drafted regarding funds, research topics, graduate training, foreign 
experts, etc. 
The total budgetary estimates for the science plan amounted to £El9,673,250 (at 
the official rate then of l = $2.35). About £E8.5 million were finally approved in 
addition to about £E3 million for a scholarship training program. 
The plan called for action of a broad scope and envisaged the reform and 
strengthening of the scientific infrastructure through its material support for existing 
laboratories and qualified personnel, and for their expansion. But it was too broad, 
too ambitious, with a definite although initially unintended bias toward basic research, 
and it overlooked the practical procedures of handling urgent problems of production and 
services. The Science Council lacked executive powers, which widened the gap between 
planning on the one hand and implementation and follow-up on the other. The experiment 
did not live long; in January 1963 a reorganization of the science structure (that 
started with the establishment of a ministry in 1961) involved new policy trends. 
The Academy Effort (1972): Within its responsibility of formulating, financing, 
and following up research projects related to national problems, the Academy entrusted 
its 14 specialized Research Councils - where the research and the production communities 
were represented - with the task of identifying some major problems facing the national 
socioeconomic plans, where research efforts could be applied to find some practical 
solutions. Several criteria were discussed for identification and priority decisions, 
and proposals were received from government ministries, production and service organiza-
tions, research institutes, and individual scientists. All were studied at length by 
the Councils, and two main types of problems were distinguished: those that had to do 
with the country in general and with its economic development, and those related to a 
particular sector. 
About 70 main research projects were finally endorsed, for 3-5-year periods; 
£El.8 million were allocated and spent in 1974, and £El.2 million were earmarked in 1975. 
Each project was the subject of a contract between the Academy and the main research 
organization in charge. Progress reports were to be regularly submitted and reviewed, 
but implementation was free of red tape. Additions to the projects were under study by 
the specialized Councils, their conferences, and the Academy governing council. 
Thus a program of research was worked out mainly as a practical plan of action 
aimed at solving important problems related to development; but at the same time the 
Academy approved the allocation of about 20% of the funds to strengthen the science base. 
Research institutes were asked to reorient their programs, and for those under 
construction, cooperation was sought between the Academy and the user sector, aiming at 
joint ventures. -
Other actions by the Academy related to the study of scientific potential; 
information and documentation; improvement in the status of the research community; 
better scientific relations internationally; and the establishment of a science policy 
studies unit. 
Within the short life of the Academy (3 years), some very positive features can 
be observed: ample participation in the preparation of programs, the establishment of 
linkages between the research community and the applied sectors, recognition of the 
social function of science, and recognition of the principle of planning coordination 
as a function of the national science policy and as a subject to be studied in itself. 
Final Remarks 
The integration between planning in scientific and other planning activities at 
the national level is still far from being reached. A crucial issue is the relation 
between scientific research and the application of modern technology. One of the 
prevailing trends of thought is that the orientation toward applied research might be 
the solution. This is true in the case of advanced countries, where science has deep 
roots and traditions, and where industry, as other sectors, has grown in the presence 
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of science and in most cases is based on its achievements. Yet in developing countries 
the case is different. It may be necessary to reverse the pyramid of this concept. It 
may even be argued that many industrial plants have been introduced, but not industry. 
To industrialize a developing country, technology has to be imported in almost 
all cases. It would seem that the only way to introduce technology into the country and 
build up indigenous scientific and technological capabilities is to ensure the full 
participation of local scientists, engineers, economists, etc., in the process of import-
ing that technology from its outset. Participation should start from the preliminary 
plans, feasibility studies, choice of technologies, contractual bargaining, adaptation 
techniques, design, construction, experimentation, operations, etc. Then, after acquiring 
such intensive training and experience, research activities can be developed inside the 
particular plant, and outside it in the concerned research institutes, whereby it would 
start from adaptive and developmental work and later pass on to applied and oriented 
basic areas. This is the real challenge facing not only the main policymaking body of 
the country, but the government and the nation as a whole, to implant technological 
capabilities and reduce technological dependence. 
INDIA 
Formulation of the Science and Technology Plan 
The National Committee on Science and Technology (NCST) was set up in 1971, and 
one of its major mandates was the preparation of a Science and Technology Plan. Previous 
government mechanisms for science and technology did not have such a mandate, but they 
did set up a number of committees and working groups for many scientific and technical 
areas, involving a number of working scientists, technologists, and industrial interests. 
To formulate the Plan, NCST adopted a combination of the sectoral approach and 
an overview of the nation's total scientific and technological effort. The Plan was 
structured in terms of 24 .socioeconomic sectors with a view to studying each sector 
critically and evolving suitable programs of research, development, and design, and S&T 
inputs more broadly, which would enable target dates to be met. Work on each sector was 
coordinated by. a Panel of NCST members, which in turn set up a number of Planning Groups/ 
Task Forces. The Planning Group has been the basic instrument for formulating the Plan. 
To aid the Planning Groups in tasks, a generalized project profile was designed. 
The process of formulating the S&T Plan that was adopted has been both democratic 
and interactive. It has directly involved over 2000 scientists, technologists, economists, 
administrators, and others and has led to a grass-roots formulation of the scientific 
and technological work that the country is capable of undertaking. Furthermore, by 
involving individuals covering the entire innovation chain, even in the definition of 
scientific and technological projects, it was possible to follow a systems approach in 
the development of the Science and Technology Plan. This has meant, for example, that the 
first step of identifying a process or product technology led in turn to the spelling out 
of the technological skills covering the entire spectrum of engineering design capability, 
material know-how, and production techniques that may be critical to the fabrication and 
manufacture of the equipment and machinery needed to commercialize that technology. Simi-
larly, emphasis on agriculture brought into focus not only nonindustrial resources like 
land and water, but also matters relating to fertilizer, pesticides, post-harvest tech-
nology, and climatic control. 
The Approach to the Science and Technology Plan: In January 1973, NCST issued a 
document that reflected its current thinking on the complex issues facing it in the pre-
paration of a science and technology plan, and that enunciated the policy framework that 
it would follow in its deliberations. The rationale for issuing this approach paper at 
that time was: 
(1) To indicate very clearly that the science and technology policies must function 
as an integral part of the country's socioeconomic plans, and that indeed they would have 
to derive their mandate from the national plans. 
(2) To ensure that all the scientific and technological activities in the country, 
including defence, atomic energy, etc., would come within the purview of the science and 
technology plan under preparation. 
(3) To develop a progressive consensus on the policy framework for science and 
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technology planning. For example, to indicate to both the scientists and the politicians 
that science and technology planning is more than a collection of R&D project proposals 
and that the extent and pace at which science and technology can contribute to national 
development depends, in a large measure, on the policies evolved and the actions taken 
outside the scientific and technological system. · 
(4) To generate discussions and debate among scientists and technologists, to 
elicit their active participation in the preparation and implementation of the Plan; 
to make explicit to managers and administrators the interdependence of the science and 
technology system and socioeconomic decision-making; to create a consensus among 
journalists and politicians and create an environment conducive to implementation of the 
Plan. 
To generate a greater consensus various seminars were organized all over the 
country, where the science and technology approach paper was discussed by scientists, 
technologists, and economists. There were in all seven seminars held in different parts 
of the country. After generating the consensus and the formulation of science and 
technology plans, the final Plan was presented to the Cabinet in August 1973. 
The Science and Technology Plan: The Science and Technology Plan indicated the 
strategy being followed by the planners, and the details of the Plan for the 24 sectors. 
Each of the sectoral plans was detailed in terms of specific projects to be carried out 
by specified organizations and agencies. The objectives of the strategic features are 
detailed in the S&T Plan. 
It is also important to realize that much of the extent and pace at which science 
and technology can contribute to national development depends upon the policies evolved 
and the actions taken outside the science and technology system. Its maximum utilization 
for achieving the socioeconomic objectives would thus require not only investments and 
changes in the scientific and technological system but also suitable adjustments in 
fiscal policies, lending policies of public financial institutions, foreign exchange 
allocation policies, industrial regulatory and import policies, and policies toward 
foreign investment. The following considerations, as pointed out in the Fifth Plan, are 
relevant for operational purposes: 
"The import of technology does not necessarily have to be linked with the 
availability of aids or credits. Secondly, institutional arrangements have to be built 
up quickly for evaluating alternative types and sources of technology and for the 
selection of imported technology in areas where indigenous technology and expertise 
do not exist. And thirdly, the domestic scientific and technical effort must be committed 
not only to the operation of technology through research and development but also through 
learning, adapting, improving, and then displacing, imported technology." 
There must be simultaneously a national commitment to increase substantially the 
total expenditure invested in science and technology so that by the end of the Fifth Plan 
period approximately 1% of the GNP is made available on a continuing basis for investments 
in S&T. The Plan has attempted to reorder financial allocations among the various 
sectors to be more in tune with declared national objectives. In this it may not always 
have completely succeeded but it has avoided advocating investments at subcritical levels. 
But the directions to be followed for matching the allocation of resources committed to 
the national scientific and technological efforts with the enunciated national socio-
economic objective have been clearly and explicitly stated in the Science and Technology 
Plan. It will be the task in the days ahead to move the science and technology system 
even closer to the priorities inherent in the national socioeconomic plans. This science 
and technology planning exercise has been the first attempt of its kind in India. The 
formulation of the Science and Technology Plan, however, is only the first step in the 
effective utilization of science and technology for development. While it charts a blue-
print for the future, it is only in its effective implementation that its success will lie. 
The Problem of Implementation: The Science and Technology Plan was prepared in 
very close collaboration with the administrative ministries concerned as well as the 
Planning Commission. Once it had been submitted to the Cabinet and accepted, it was left 
to the ministries to implement the Five-Year Plan through asking for allocations for the 
concerned programs in their annual budget allocations. However, the resources available, 
even for completing the projects at hand, were scarce and any additional investments that 
were requested for the Science and Technology Plan were pared considerably. It was at 
this stage that NCST, having obtained an overall picture of the resources being allocated 
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to the different sectors, and having decided that these reallocations of resources were 
quite at variance with the projected Science and Technology Plan, sought an intervention 
from the political leadership. The case was presented to the Standing Council of 
Ministries that, to avoid long-term deleterious efforts, it was necessary to ensure that 
adequate resources were made available and that the relative allocations among sectors 
should be done in a scientific and consistent manner. As a result it was decided that 
an annual S&T plan would be drawn up by the National Committee on Science and Technology 
keeping in view the financial restraints and selecting areas for investment. 
It is this Plan that is now under implementation, and NCST is now examining 
methods of monitoring it. 
KOREA 
Interfacing of Science and Technology Planning with the Economic Development Plan 
The emergence of science and technology planning has posed the question of how 
it is integrated into the Economic Development Plan. Such integration is considered 
inevitable, because industrial production requires technological inputs in addition to 
labour and raw materials. Modern production systems require labour that bears a specific 
skill, capital that contains varying degrees of scientific and technical knowledge, and 
raw materials that rely on preprocessing by related suppliers. 
S&T planning is intended to influence the productive capacity of an economy 
through the promotion of science and technology. When resources for S&T activities are 
scarce, it becomes necessary to set priorities. 
Since the establishment of the Science and Technology Ministry in Korea, S&T 
policy has aimed at fostering the country's technical capacity and directing the activ-
ities toward national goals. There has been an effort to identify specific industrial 
needs for technology and to supply technologies through research institutions in the 
country. However, this has not assured an adequate supply of technology for a product-
based need. 
It is traditional for the formulation of science and technology policy to lag 
behind that of economic development. This lapse seems to have caused underachievement 
in the Economic Development Plan due to lack of technical input. It is partially due 
to the lack of analysis and of translation of economic development into specific 
technology needs. It has also been recognized that the timing of science and technology 
planning can provide a better integration of the Science and Technology Plan into 
economic development planning through more appropriate timing. 
Framework of the Interfacing: The general framework of the interfacing is 
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The first interaction is initiated by feeding information about the Economic 
Development Plan to a science and technology planning group, which in turn reviews the 
information, generates its own information, and feeds it back to an economic development 
planning group. This exchange of information between the two groups can be repeated to 
perfect a workable plan. 
In the administrative structure of the government, the economic planning authority 
is distinguishable from the authority on science and technology planning. The economic 
planning group is traditionally composed of economists, mathematicians, statisticians, 
and planners in various disciplines. The science and technoJogy planning group, by and 
large, consists of the scientists and engineers within the administration. The S&T 
planning activity is less extensive than the economic planning activities. Science and 
technology planning can be independent from economic planning by virtue of its own 
unique function. In view of the consequences of science and technology planning and 
the resources required for research activities, it seems necessary to coordinate the two 
groups of planners to merge the contents of planning into an integrated unit. 
For the preparation of the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the 
Economic Planning Board formed 22 sectoral planning groups, which were expected to draw 
up preliminary plans in each sector and submit them to the overall coordinating group. 
The formation of these sectoral groups reflects the existing ministerial 
organization, thus making the top planners at the ministries participate in the plann~ng. 
Additional planners are expected to arrive from research organizations, trade associations, 
and academic communities. An intense involvement of S&T planners is expected in the 
sectors of heavy and chemical industries, light industries, transportation, natural 
resources, energy, and employment and manpower. 
Science and technology planning may be extended beyond these six planning 
sectors. For practical reasons, the involvement of science and technology planners 
is to be contained in the sectors predominantly oriented toward hardware technology. 
At least in the six planning sectors, interaction between economic planners and science 
and technology planners is assured for the coming Economic DeveloJlllent Plan. 
All sectoral planners are to be versed in the goals of the Economic Development 
Plan: development of agricultural and energy resources; enhancement of domestic 
earnings in export; a proper structure for the development of heavy and chemical indus-
tries; development of the science and management of business and manpower; development 
of land resources and maximum expansion of employment opportunities; price stabilization, 
improvement of taxation, and amelioration of banking; dispersion of population and 
industries to nonurban areas; enhancement of investment for social development; improve-
ment of working conditions; expansion of the housing, welfare, cultural, and social 
security systems; and improvement of efficiency in development administration. 
As described above, the participation of science and technology planners in the 
sectoral groups assures the integration of S&T planning into the Economic Development 
Plan. At this stage of planning, the science and technology planning group is sub-
grouped into metals, shipbuilding, textiles, machinery, electronics, petrochemicals, and 
energy. At the working level each subgroup is expected to break down the assigned 
branches into a project to be evaluated in terms of technological constraints, tech-
nological alternatives, and the required resources for the development and importation 
of technology. The economist in each planning sector must supply a feasible output of 
the industrial sector to the science and technology planners. The feasible output in 
the plan period should also be based on the overall growth, investment, resources, 
employment, and other discernable economic variables. 
When the output of the industrial sector is given, science and technology 
planners are able to review technical requirements to meet the output: 
(a) Current capacity of production (capital goods and labour) 
(b) Current requirement of raw materials 
(c) Technical requirement of skilled labour 
(d) Investment requirement for a new product 
(e) Investment requirement for additional capacity 
(f) Extent of technology importation 
(g) Supply plan for domestic technology 
(h) Alternatives of better product mix. 
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The output requirements in each industrial sector are critical information for 
the science and technology group. This output requirement can be a tentative figure 
until the technical feasibility is ascertained. Finally, a feasible output in each 
sector can be adjusted across the other sectors of industries by the coordinating group. 
As a tool for the systematic treatment of S&T requirements, a product-technology 
matrix is being employed. The matrix was prepared in 1969; it is subdivided into 
16 industrial sectors with about 100 products each, and vertically into about 70 tech-
nologies. Each cell identifies the required technology inputs to produce a product, and 
qualifies it as major, minor, or not available in the country. Monetary values employed 
are those of the equipment or productive facilities that contain the technology. An 
index may be obtained for a certain technology (e.g., cold rolling), which shows not 
only the value of the technical element but also the total effect on other products. 
This tool, however, lacks the dynamic possibility of expanding the horizon of S&T because 
it is limited to existing knowledge, so that a supplementary methodology is needed for 
such aspects, as would be the case if the problem of energy technology for the future 
were being considered. 
MEXICO 
The National Indicative Science and Technology Plan 
In recent times Mexico's scientific and in particular technological dependency 
upon the outside world has increased instead of diminishing. Isolated attempts to 
rectify the situation by promoting R&D activities in the universities and in the public 
sector were not accompanied by the elaboration of a national policy on· science and 
technology until very recently, when the National Council for Science and Technology 
(CONACYT) was set up at the beginning of the 1970s. In close cooperation with the 
scientific community, leading universities, and representatives of the public and private 
sectors, CONACYT formulated in 1975/76 the first Science and Technology Plan, covering 
basically the 1976-1982 period but within the framework of a longer-term R&D strategy. 
The confrontation of the existing situation with the country's probable R&D 
needs indicated that the science and technology system should expand considerably, 
requiring an increase in financial and human resources as well as an integration of 
those efforts into a general planning framework. Given the nature of scientific and 
technological activities, the characteristics of the Mexican economic model, and the 
official ideology, such planning cannot but be indicative and participative. As regards 
S&T, planning should not only foster the expansion of R&D but aim at creating demand for 
domestically produced scientific and technological knowledge, because in the developing 
countries the mere supply of know-how does not create the demand for it. 
The Mexican Science and Technology Plan is based on two premises: first, that 
the importance of science and technology for socioeconomic development makes its longer-
term planning an urgent necessity for any country; second, that the need for scientific 
and technological planning, while safeguarding freedom of research, is even more pressing 
in countries like Mexico, because of the persistence of underdevelopment, the relative 
scarcity of the government's financial resources, and the magnitude of the still unsatis-
fied basic needs of the majority of the population. 
The main objectives of the Science and Technology Plan were defined as non-
imitative scientific development, cultural autonomy, and technological self-determination. 
Scientific development should be understood here as the creation of a capacity for 
research in the exact, natural, and social sciences that would enable the scientific 
community to fulfill its social function and, at the same time, to participate meaning-
fully in the process of international scientific advancement. Cultural autonomy is an 
objective related to safeguarding certain societal values that are being l.ost in the 
process of industrialization in many developing countries. Lastly, technological self-
determination is defined as the construction of a domestic capacity that would permit 
the demand for technology to be reoriented progressively to the extent needed toward 
local sources of technical knowledge, that would rationalize purchases of foreign 
technology, and that would help the assimilation and adaptation of the imported know-how, 
using it for the internal generation of technology. 
The S&T policy required for this in the long run should be guided by the 
following principles: 
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(a) S&T policy should be integrated with development policy; 
(b) The development of S&T should be adapted to the country's long-term 
objectives; 
(c) Autonomous S&T development does not mean ceasing to employ external S&T 
knowledge; 
(d) To overcome present S&T backwardness requires a joint effort by government, 
scientific, and educational institutions and the productive system; 
(e) A favourable environment is needed, including the recognition of the social 
value of S&T; 
(f) Excellence should be attained in some key fields hitherto little developed; 
(g) Meaningful technological advance requires activity on several fronts: se-
lected areas of conventional R&D, appropriate primitive technologies of local origin, and 
certain fields that offer hope for significant breakthroughs; 
(h) The S&T system should have close links with the educational system and the 
economy. 
Because of the present S&T backwardness, the Plan devotes much attention to 
problems of the S&T infrastructure, including training, diffusion of knowledge, infor-
mation, statistics, engineering and consulting services, production and maintenance of 
scientific equipment and instruments, and international scientific cooperation. In each 
case, the Plan suggests long-term objectives and medium-term policy guidelines. 
With respect to R&D itself, the Plan defines objectives and sets guidelines for 
problem-oriented research activities both in exact and natural sciences and in social 
disciplines. In th~ field of applied R&D it develops technological policy guidelines 
for nutrition, agriculture and forestry, communications, urban development, industry, 
energy, renewable resources, construction and housing, medicine and health, educational 
techniques, and natural phenomena research. The Plan emphasizes that the scientific 
advancement must be based not only on the recognition of university autonomy but on the 
state's commitment to guarantee the academic and research freedom necessary to foster 
scientific creativity. The specific scientific and technological policy guidelines are 
expected to be translated into institutional and sectoral programs with the aid of some 
relatively simple interinstitutional mechanisms designed to achieve that end. Just as the 
formulation of the Science and Technology Plan itself, these mechanisms for programing 
and implementation should be indicative, participative, and flexible. 
The Plan postulates that by 1982, expenditures on science ind technology in 
Mexico should reach a total of 16,200 million pesos ($1 ,300 million at 1975 prices), i.e., 
almost three times the 1976 spending level and slightly more than 1% of the GNP. The 
outlay for research and development alone should rise from 3,090 million pesos ($250 
million) in 1976 to 9,200 million pesos ($735 million at 1975 prices) by 1982. A slight 
reduction in the government's share of total expenditures from its current level of 80% 
to 75% is assumed, along with the proportionate increase in private sector spending. 
Furthermore, planning offers medium-term targets for R&D support activities, and a pack-
age of science and technology policy instruments aimed at increasing the productivity 
of R&D is proposed. Finally, the setting up of mechanisms for evaluating the progress 
of the Plan's implementation is considered. 
Independent of the degree of success that Mexico may have with the implementation 
of its Science and Technology Plan, the exercise of the Plan itself offers many lessons 
to other developing countries. 
The first is the need to recognize that science and technology problems in the 
context of general underdevelopment differ basically from those encountered by science 
and technology in the advanced world. Thus, the advancement in this field in the 
developing part of the international economy can hardly be achieved by methods more or 
less successfully applied in the world's industrial centres. Since scientific and 
technological backwardness is part of the overall underdevelopment, science and tech-
nology policies must be integrated into the general development policy framework. The 
absence of such a framework limits severely the relevance of any attempt to build up 
domestic scientific and technological capacity. 
The second lesson is that one of the major obstacles for the advancement·of science 
and technology in a country like Mexico originates from the divorce between local R&D 
activities and the educational and productive systems. Consequently, whatever knowledge 
is produced domestically is used neither for improvement of the quality of education 
nor for productive purposes. Mexican experiences strongly suggest that the supply of 
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internally produced scientific knowledge and technical know-how does not automatically 
create a demand for them, because the demand is historically directed to the outside 
world. Consequently, the advancement of science and technology in a developing country 
depends more upon the effort to establish links between the R&D system, the educational 
system, and the economy than upon the simple increase in human and financial resources 
allocated to R&D. Strategies that postulate the establishment of modern scientific 
institutes while leaving applied R&D effort to traditional international transfer mech-
anisms just cannot work. In the absence of demand for their output, modern scientific 
institutes set up in the developing societies wither away and become focal points of 
brain drain. At the same time, the dependence on traditional technology transfer mech-
anisms leads to the emergence of advanced technology enclaves that perpetuate themselves 
in the context of general technological backwardness. The question here is not whether 
such technology transfers, for example through foreign-owned enterprises, are of any use 
in the absolute sense. They may be useful or useless depending on the presence or absence 
of other vehicles for the transfer and propagation of technical know-how in a developing 
society. And only the technological strategy designed to establish permanent links 
between technological imports and the domestic R&D system, on the one hand, and the local 
R&D output and the educational and productive systems, on the other, can assure in the 
longer run the meaningful technological modernization of a developing country. 
A third point is that the domestic science and technology system in a developing 
country must be defined not just as the sum of local R&D producing entities, but as the 
universe of all units dedicated to R&D, to R&D supporting activities, and to inter-
mediating between the R&D institutions and higher-learning bodies as well as productive 
enterprises. The intermediation is not unidirectional - from those who produce knowledge 
to those who use it - but should be visualized as a sort of two-directional triangular 
relationship. If science and technology policymakers in the advanced countries seem to 
forget this, it is because they lack historical perspective. In all the advanced 
societies the sort of triangular relationship between science and technology, education, 
and production, absent in the developing societies, was built up slowly and without any 
sort of planning over the last two centuries. This statement also covers socialist 
societies. Contrary to widespread belief, they were not scientifically or technologically 
backward in their presocialist times, particularly when compared with the majority of 
developing countries as we know them today. The Soviet Union before 1917, Poland before 
1945, and China before 1948 were quite advanced in all possible respects in comparison 
with most of Latin America, Africa, and Asia in the mid-20th century. Thus, if one wants 
to advance science and technology in the developing world, one faces a difficult task of 
devising policy instruments affecting the broad R&D system as defined above and revising 
at the same time educational and economic policies in light of the scientific and tech-
nological effort. 
The fourth major lesson of the Mexican exercise may be that we know very little 
about the interrelations, particularly in the context of underdevelopment, present inside 
of the continuum known as R&D. The simplistic proposition that every country needs to 
support in a similar way all parts of that continuum (because allegedly pure science 
is needed to prepare the ground for applied scientific effort, which is needed, in turn, 
for technological development) is open to many criticisms on logical, structural, and 
historical grounds. Only by accepting our ignorance with respect to the relationships 
within R&D, by agreeing that the social functions of different parts of the R&D continuum 
vary considerably, and by relating the production of knowledge to some overall view of 
long-term social, economic, and national objectives of a given society, is it possible 
to arrive at a broad vision of national science and technology strategy for a developing 
country or region. 
A final major point is that science and technology policy problems cannot be 
meaningfully handled just by scientists and technologists, if only because science and 
technology is not a specialized sector but affects every phase of social, economic, 
cultural, and even political life. Furthermore if the proposition that science and 
technology is not socially neutral is accepted, the conclusion may be reached that 
planning scientific and technological endeavours is a very complicated matter in which 
all available wise men from different walks of life, including wise politicians if 
available, should perhaps participate. This may be particularly true in the context of 
underdevelopment where it may well be that scientific and technological elites, while 
sometimes highly educated, are in other respects as backward as the societies in which 
they function. 
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Many other important lessons could be drawn from the Mexican exercise, but the 
purpose here is to highlight the key issues only. 
VENEZUELA 
The First National Science and Technology Plan 
Venezuela recently prepared its Fifth Development Plan, and some time later work 
was started on a S&T Plan. The combined objectives stated in the Fifth Plan, with the 
state controlling over 5D% of total investment, offered excellent opportunities for the 
country's S&T development, but for this it is necessary to establish an institutional 
structure that permits systematic and continuous interaction with the main decision 
centres that formulate policies or consume large volumes of technology. This situation 
also demands that research centres change that attitude and organization toward an 
effective management cf technology to permit not only the solution of day-to-day problems, 
but also the capitalization of opportunities presented by the new dimensions of public 
and private investment. 
This Plan, because of the quantity of accelerated investment involved, implies 
the risk of strengthening rather than reducing technological dependence. The main 
objectives of the Plan were: 
- diversification of the economy 
- full employment 
supply of the essential inputs for the majority group with low economic 
resources 
- deconcentration of economic activity 
- exportation of nontraditional goods 
- protection of natural resources 
- reduction of the external vulnerability of the economy. 
These objectives make the following demands upon the local scientific and 
technological infrastructure: 
(a) Generation of new methods and processes to increase agricultural and 
industrial productivity with emphasis on optimum employment generation. 
(b) Production of technology that will permit rational use of nonrenewable 
natural resources and an increase in the local aggregate value of the basic products. 
(c) Changes in the nutritional composition of mass-consumption food products 
without diminishing the purchasing capacity of the low-income groups. 
(d) Rational selection of technologies, and capacity to use imported technology, 
to induce the development of local technology. 
(e) Development of design engineering capabilities and of the technology of 
capital goods production as indispensable links between laboratory activity and the 
commercialization of the results. 
(f) Macrosocial evaluation of technology in view of the criteria for optimizing 
the generation of employment and preserving ecological balance. 
(g) Production of technologies to permit construction of housing adapted to the 
climatic and cultural conditions of each region. 
(h) Production of new teaching systems that are better adapted to the nature of 
Venezuelan students, and that will permit greater access to the educational system and 
encourage its qualitative improvement. 
(i) Increase in basic research in universities to guarantee a more qualified 
higher-education sector and to accelerate by means of better qualified human resources 
the innovation capacity of the productive sector. 
Work on the S&T Plan was started a year after the Fifth Plan had been finished. 
Previous work on the STPI Project had allowed the National Council for Scientific and 
Technical Research (CONICIT), the agency entrusted with the task, to examine institu-
tional aspects of the scientific and technological policy and the interactions with 
economic policy. This revealed the weight of implicit policy. Other work on the 
operative aspects of technology transfer (internal and external) revealed that one of 
the main obstacles to reorienting the local technology supply toward the requirements 
of the productive system was the users' inability to identify their needs and the lack 
of managerial skills of local suppliers that might have allowed them to present their 
developments in a usable manner. As a result of this research it became clear that any 
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plan without the support of the economic and political decision centres would be con-
verted into a simple academic exercise. Hence, a promotional strategy was adopted that 
gave the planning process a techno-political nature, seeking the participation of the 
highest political authorities in the country, who were given the responsibility of co-
ordinating each work-group meeting during the central event, the First Congress of 
Science and Technology. 
Very early it was decided that the S&T Plan should be an operative plan. However, 
CONICIT lacked the means for a correct appreciation of reality as well as the institutional 
channels that would allow it to make a precise diagnosis of the different component 
parts of the system. It could not be accepted as valid, given the existing separation 
between the productive sector and the research centres, that groups of CONICIT scientists 
and technicians should, in isolation, define the image to be pursued by the S&T system. 
To overcome such restrictions, the planning exercise began with a national 
mobilization within principal sectors of the economy by means of regional meetings of 
entrepreneurs, researchers, science promoters, planners, and government leaders. Each 
event was like an open forum, with the CONICIT staff acting as technical secretaries 
and with flexible guidelines, the purpose being to draw up recommendations. Fifteen 
sectoral meetings were held in areas such as metallurgy, health, food technology, and 
agriculture. These events pursued the triple aim of: 
(l) Broadening the support base for the plan; 
(2) Obtaining information regarding the real requirements of the productive 
sector; 
(3) Defining objectives that, although not necessarily ideal, would emerge from 
the decisions made by the consensus of the panel participants, using as a basis the 
sectoral priorities and plans already defined by the Fifth Plan. 
After each meeting the participants were divided into specialized groups, which 
prepared documents for presentation at the First Congress of Science and Technology. 
This Congress was attended by some 2000 participants, 60% from the research 
sector. It recognized CONICIT as the guiding organ of S&T policy, and accepted the need 
to reorganize S&T in relation to development objectives. Priority research areas were 
defined, grouped as regards their contribution to social variables (e.g., nutrition, 
housing, health), the modernization of the economy (e.g., capital goods), the raising 
of the value of nonrenewable resources, and the mastery of technology. CONICIT, as the 
principal implementer of recommendations, reorganized its structure to take on its new 
responsibility to make a coordinated plan. 
CONICIT obtained a reformulation of the science and technology aspects in the 
Fifth Plan, and introduced elements of policy such as the obligation for state companies 
to open technological packets and the guarantee of financial support for research 
activities within these companies. 
The most important characteristics of this process are the following: 
(a) Mobilization of resources is begun even before the eleboration of the Plan, 
which makes the process dynamic. 
(b) From the start the Plan was identified as a technical-political action, 
which eliminated the possibility of generating negative results. 
(c) It has a participatory character: in each meeting a basic document was 
presented, which was then transformed and enriched with the opinions of the intervening 
groups. 
(d) A support basis is obtained because each participant identifies with post-
Congress action. · 
(e) The Plan emerged as a requirement of the community and was not something 
imposed by a group of intellectuals. Besides, it had political support even before it 
was launched. 
(f) The institution entrusted with the definition and supervision of the Plan 
obtained strong support. 
(g) The various decision-making centres that are as yet dispersed will attempt 
coordination to fulfill the directions of the Congress; this will provide an excellent 
opportunity to give a certain coherence to the system. 
In synthesis, the most important aspect from an internal point of view is that 
this process constitutes a real experience with regard to learning on the job and 
technological independence in planning. Its main fault lies in the fact that the close 
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attention paid to external planning aspects implies neglect for internal methodological 
aspects, such as the weighting of objectives, diminished distribution.of resources, etc. 
Throughout the Plan, an effort is made systematically to adjust this phase of the process. 
FINANCING 
Financial instruments are keys in building up a S&T infrastructure and putting it 
to work according to the requirements of social and economic development. They are not 
easy to develop and perfect, and they need a good backing of policy and of skilled 
personnel; in fact the more scientifically developed the country, the more developed its 
financial mechanisms with respect to science and technology. 
The experiences of several STPI countries are reviewed below; in addition there 
is a short description of financial instruments in Japan, as an example of the full 
development of such instruments. 
Several interesting observations can be made from these examples, and a brief 
summary is attempted below: 
(a) Without financial mechanisms it is difficult to influence the development of 
S&T capacity and the type of activities carried out by it. 
(b) Financial instruments are not differentiated in practice according to 
whether they support the building up of S&T capacity or its use; both purposes may be 
supported by the same scheme, and in fact many programs have to do with both aspects. 
There may however be a case for using a specific fund for moderate to large investments 
in S&T capaci_ty because criteria for the allocation of resources may be different in 
creating S&T capacity and in using existing S&T capacity. 
(c) Financial mechanisms may be of a supplementary nature, i.e., funds that are 
allocated over and above the current budgets of institutions. This may be done through 
a central fund or through one or more sectoral funds. A more comprehensive approach 
would be to prepare a consolidated National Budget for S&T that incorporates not only the 
central and sectoral funds but also the individual budgets of government organizations 
devoted to S&T. This approach is being promoted by UNESCO and has recently been applied 
in Colombia. It requires a great deal of political support and commitment. The point 
is how far the the programs of institutions that are financed by their own resources can 
be influenced according to more general considerations. This may take a lot of effort 
in persuasion, and in fact S&T planning exercises seek this type of effect, as can be 
seen in the examples of India and Mexico. 
(d) Some of the documents reviewed here suggest orienting the S&T effort through 
the judicious application of supplementary financial means, rather than centralizing 
decision-making and program formulation or evaluation. The question is how high a 
proportion of the total government expenditure in S&T may be needed in the central fund, 
or in sectoral funds, to produce a significant effect on the orientation of the resources 
directly handled by the agencies, particularly when the S&T system is organized in a 
pluralistic fashion with many centres of decision among which there is little coordina-
tion. In the case of Mexico it is felt that the present proportion of slightly over 11% 
is not enough, and moreover it is suggested that the experience of the National S&T 
Council shows that an organization of this nature - of which many exist in the developing 
countries - has little chance of being successful in its efforts at persuasion. 
(e) It is likely that several different funds are needed, each with its own 
purpose, rather than just one central fund. The increase in the supply of S&T, the 
orientation of activities, and the increase in demand on the part of industry are the 
obvious purposes that are put forth by countries with a central fund only or a few 
sectoral funds. As development proceeds and experience is gained, as in Brazil and a 
fortiori in Japan, other important purposes are identified and specific financial 
mechanisms become necessary for them - for instance, the support for consulting activ-
ities in Brazil or the risk capital for industrial innovation in Japan. 
(f) For a proper use of financial instruments several things are needed: a 
clear policy regarding the types of S&T activities to be supported - for instance, basic 
research, graduate training, technological development; a set of priorities regarding 
beneficiary branches, disciplines, types of institutions; adequate technical and admin-
istrative skills for evaluation,- follow-up and other tasks; and project-formulation 
skills in the applicant institutions. General policy and guidelines regarding priorities 
may be put out by the central S&T authorities, but the translation of such policy and 
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priorities into operative programs very much depends on the organizational structure in 
charge of the financial instrument (as can clearly be seen in the case of Brazil), so 
there may be considerable scope for second-level policy decisions, which in fact may end 
up shaping the instrument rather differently from what was originally expected by the 
planners and principal decision-makers. 
(g) An interesting issue concerns the emphasis to be put on project funding rather 
than on institution funding. There are advantages and disadvantages to each procedure, 
and one of them may be more convenient than the other in certain circumstances. In 
general, funding by project would seem to be more appropriate because a purpose can be 
defined and a program of work assessed, and this also has a strong educational value for 
the institution. But it is the largest institutions that tend to obtain most of the 
funds - a small institution may not be able to prepare a good project proposal or 
achieve the minimum size needed to make the project worthwhile. As pointed out in the 
case of Brazil, a concentration of funds takes place in some large institutions, so that 
existing imbalances among institutions and regions are further reinforced. This "Matthew 
principle" has on the other hand certain advantages from the point of view of efficiency 
because the projects can be properly planned, with sufficient critical mass to ensure 
a good probability of success. Trade-offs between both effects would seem to be an 
important matter for debate. In the case of Peru's industrial R&D fund, the largest 
enterprises profit because they can formulate sufficiently large projects; medium and 
small enterprises will in many cases be obliged to turn the 2% funds over to ITINTEC, 
to be ultimately employed in activities that may not benefit them. 
(h) The experience of Japan shows how long it takes to develop and perfect a 
system of financial instruments for S&T. Developing countries should be prepared to 
undertake a lengthy learning process. 
KOREA 
Funding of S&T by the Public Sector(l 3) 
A powerful instrument for the promotion of science and technology is resource 
allocation. Research funds are drawn from government, private, and foreign sources. The 
government share ranged from 66% to 71% of the total annual R&D expenditures in the 
1970-73 period. The figure in 1973 was 8.3 billion won while total R&D expenditure was 
15.6 billion won. 
The annual government budget for science and technology accounts for about 2% 
of the total government budget, a relatively low proportion compared with that of 
advanced countries. Of the 8.3 billion won allocated to research by the government 
and the public sector in 1973, 79% was spent on research in government-owned and public 
research institutes, 17% in private institutes, 2.3% in colleges and universities, and 
1.9% in private businesses. The trend in the last 5 years shows a proportion similar 
to the allocation in 1973. 
The budgetary instrument is a common tool of policy implementation and is 
ubiquitous both in developed and developing countries. To secure a sufficient budget 
for research, the concerned ministries have to produce justifiable and convincing 
documents. It therefore becomes a very difficult task to secure funds for a new project. 
Perhaps for these reasons, the government budget for research has not increased as much 
as the favourable public opinion toward science and technology. In this context, 
reliance on the budgetary instrument has limitations. 
Allocation of the budget for research is as important as the source of funds. 
Judging from the disposal of R&D expenditures by the government, a large portion of ~he 
budget is spent on precommitted research and development, and a relatively small portion 
on project-based research and development. Ninety-five research institutes under 
different ministries carry on their own research activities, which tends to limit the 
relative size of the budget oriented to project-based research and development. The 
Ministry of Science and Technology manages approximately 200 million won of research 
grants on a project basis. The government being the promoter and initiator of research 
and development in the earlier stage of industrialization, a generous share of the 
government budget is used to promote scientific activities. Particularly, a sizable 
sum of uncommitted budget is needed to widen the horizon of research, which eventually 
enriches the national wealth. An institution-based commitment to research expenditure 
may run the danger of tying up the large budget. Consequently, flexible adaptability 
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of the budget to the dynamic requirements of research needs can be hampered. 
Scientific and technological activities are so diverse and extensive that 
practically all government ministries are partially involved in carrying them out and 
at the same time they turn to users of research results. To successfully implement 
science and technology policy, extensive coordination and interministerial cooperation 
is required. For instance, high-caliber manpower training and basic research have to be 
carried out at educational institutes. Except for the Korea Advanced Institute of 
Science, both public and private colleges and universities are under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Education. To implement and direct the scientific activities of the 
nation, a science and technology policy must be adopted by the Ministry of Education. 
Likewise, the enhancement and development of skills that are vital to production have 
to be carried out in part by educational institutes. It is particularly relevant that 
in-service training is deemed necessary under the circumstances of scarce skilled labour. 
The Ministry of Conmerce and Industry is in a better position to induce industries to 
expand in-service training and to initiate vocational training at the Ministry's own 
cost. 
In view of the large number of research institutes under different ministries 
and independent research organizations, it is inevitable that policy is implemented 
through a network of administrative and research organizations. KIST was established 
and is operated on a principle of autonomy of research. However, close conmunication 
between researchers and policy makers and the involvement of researchers in policy 
formulation have immensely improved the practicality of policy formulation and imple-
mentation. The interlocking of communication and information among concerned organiza-
tions has therefore to be established for the effective implementation of science and 
technology policy. 
Persuasion is a kind of informal instrument. In retrospect, the frequent visits 
of government officials to research institutes served the purpose of persuasion. Public 
speeches and explanations of science and technology policy through mass communication 
media have helped gain public understanding of science and technology policy. The 
creation of a favourable environment for science and technology can effectively be 
achieved by persuasion. 
The budgetary instrument is direct and may achieve immediate results. This 
instrument has the relative advantage of flexible maneuvering of scientific activities 
as needs are verified. The current S&T budget is largely tied to a fixed expenditure 
by maintaining a large number of existing institutions. The budgetary instrument can be 
used to reorganize existing government research organizations into a sizable multi-
disciplinary research organization. This reorganization can produce a better allocation 
of the budget for need-oriented, project-based research and can provide a base for 
utilizing the organization instrument more effectively. 
The prevailing government budget allocation for S&T seems to be limited to 
supporting research at individual corporations because of other competing allocations. 
In view of the relatively small share of grant-in-aid budget for research and develop-
ment, it appears necessary to raise the budget to maintain the flexibility of overall 
budgetary allocation. This measure will undoubtedly improve the effectiveness of S&T 
policy implementation. At the same time, a systematic approach is required to determine 
and set priorities of research needs in the context of economic activities. 
COLOMBIA 
Financing of R&D by the Public Sector(l 4l 
The Central Fund: The Colombian Fund for Scientific Research and Special 
Projects (COLCIENCIAS) undertakes the financing of research projects with the aim of 
stimulating R&D activity in the country. 
COLCIENCIAS has financed a total of 350 projects for a total value of about 
Col$50,000,000 (almost $2,000,000) in the course of its 6 years of existence. This 
financial mechanism has been the principal instrument for the implementation of the 
research policies formulated by COLCIENCIAS - in its role of Executive Secretariat of 
the National Council of Science and Technology - and it has been employed in a strategic 
way to complement the funds of the different institutes that are carrying out research. 
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Without this financial mechanism, the power to influence such activities in the country 
would be minimal. Hence the functions of financing and of formulating a national policy 
in this field are complementary and should be carried out in an integrated manner. 
A valid question in relation to this financing activity is the effect that R&D 
activities have had on the economic and social development of the country. There are two 
aspects here. First, the stimulation of research through the financing of projects has 
helped to strengthen the infrastructure and the national S&T capacity by supporting the 
institutions dedicated to these activities, stimulating research in the universities and 
other centres, contributing to the training of researchers, increasing the facilities and 
resources of research in the country, and so forth. 
Without denying the importance of this, a complementary question arises concerning 
the real use that is being made of the results of this research and the effective con-
tribution that it is making to the development of the country. Such results should be 
transformed into concrete technological innovations that contribute to the solution of 
national problems or to the development of the country. This implies, among other things, 
that the function of COLCIENCIAS is not limited to financing research projects. It also 
includes the use of these results by the productive sector, which would imply following 
up the results or effects of each project. 
Despite the fact that the majority of projects financed by COLCIENCIAS have been 
in the field of applied research, it is difficult to determine or estimate what propor-
tion of them has been transformed into concrete technological innovations and is there-
fore contributing to the development of the country. Reference has not been made here to 
the fact that a research project can suggest theoretically, or on paper, a technological 
innovation, but to the fact that such results are being effectively put into practice in 
the productive sector (or for the potential users of this knowledge). Unless this is so, 
one cannot speak of technological innovation. 
This point reveals an important bottleneck in the financial system of scientific 
and technological activities in Colombia. The funds of COLCIENCIAS are generally used to 
finance research (basic and applied) whose results might suggest or describe a new tech-
nological process or a specific technological innovation. The activity of this institu-
tion is much more limited in the phase that immediately follows, which is the financing 
of the transition from these results to their effective use in the productive sector. 
This transition phase includes activities such as the engineering of design and the 
setting up of an experiment or a pilot scheme that is transformed effectively into an 
innovation in the productive sector. 
The lack of a financial mechanism specifically oriented to this transition phase 
is a serious limitation to the transformation of the national research effort into tech-
nological innovations that can contribute to the development of the country. One of the 
consequences is that research results tend simply to be filed away or are limited to the 
enrichment of scientific knowledge on the whole without this being transformed into con-
crete innovations. 
In relation to this, COLCIENCIAS has been examining in conjunction with FONADE 
(National Fund of Development Projects) the possibility of creating a special fund 
specifically oriented toward financing activities of technological development that ensure 
or facilitate the connection between basic and applied research and the effective use 
of the results of this research in the productive sector. Given the nature of this 
activity, the fund would have to take into consideration explicitly the relatively high 
risk involved in defining the criteria it would use in its functioning. 
National Budget for Science and Technology: Colombia has recently adopted a 
consolidated budget for S&T activities financed by the state and its agencies. This is 
a high-level central government mechanism to make explicit the public expenditures 
related to S&T activities, with the following purposes: 
(a) To embody the Science and Technology Function within the functional classi-
fication of the National General Budget to be employed in the 1977 fiscal year and 
thereafter. 
(b) To make explicit within the Science and Technology Function the present and 
future public expenditures for scientific and technological activities to be included in 
the National General Budget. 
(c) To establish progressively the exact orientation and coordination of the 
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program budgets for scientific and technological activities included into the Science 
and Technology Function, so that scientific and technological activities of the public 
sector will be related to the objectives of socioeconomic development. 
The establishment of this National Budget for S&T activities is a joint project 
of COLCIENCIAS, the General Direction of the Budget, and the National Planning Depart-
ment, the leadership having been assumed by COLCIENCIAS. The main achievements so far 
have been: 
(a) The substantial modification of the forms and instructions to be used in the 
elaboration of the tentative budgets of public institutions for the 1977 fiscal year; 
(b) The establishment of new budget programs for public scientific and tech-
nological activities; 
(c) The explicit inclusion into the budget's functional classification of the 
Science and Technology Function and its five subfunctions (postgraduate education for 
science and technology; research and experimental development; diffusion, extension, and 
technical assistance; scientific and technological services and resources management; 
science and technology management). 
The implementation of this mechanism is only just starting. Its achievements will depend 
on the institutional support it will gain. 
BRAZIL 
Financing Instruments in the Second Basic Plan for S&T Development (1975-77)(l 5l 
The Second Basic Plan for S&T Development (PBDCT) has as a financial scheme a 
3-year budget by program, which however does not yet constitute a truly consolidated 
National Budget for S&T. Programs, projects, and activities in the Plan are to be 
financed by budgetary resources and various receipts of the federal organization (in-
cluding enterprises), with supplementary resources channeled through special agencies 
and special funds, and to a small extent with resources coming from abroad. The pro-
portions are 44%, 32%, and 4% of the total Plan expenditures in 1975-77; in addition 
20% is to come from other internal sources. The supplementary resources are to come 
from the following sources: 
(a) National Fund for S&T Development (FNDCT), which is the principal financial 
instrument of the Second PBDCT; it is administered by FINEP (see below); 
(b) National Research Council (CNPq), which has a budget of its own to finance 
research programs and training and specialization programs; 
(c) CAPES, a fund in the Education Ministry principally devoted to postgraduate 
fellowships in Brazil and abroad; 
(d) National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), which manages a fund for tech-
nological development, FUNTEC, with applications preferentially oriented toward the 
funding of specific applied research and development projects in nationally owned 
enterprises; 
(e) Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), which finances technological 
development projects of nationally owned enterprises, including support to national 
consulting and engineering firms. 
Financial support is given to specific programs or projects carried out by 
public and pr.ivate entities, through soft credits or nonreimbursable loans. The pro-
portion of total S&T Plan expenditure financed by these mechanisms has gone up from 23% 
for the First Plan to 32% for the Second Plan. In this way a strong influence is 
exerted on the overall allocation of resources by making it possible to carry out certain 
projects and giving a minimum dimension to others that otherwise would not be efficiently 
carried out. In the implementation of a S&T policy, the catalytic function of certain 
organizations may be more important than the mass of resources they contribute, prin-
cipally when this takes place in an institutional context of traditional fragmentation 
and low coordination levels, as it does in Brazil. 
The National Fund for S&T Development (FNDCT) was created in 1969 to give 
financial support to prioritary programs and projects of S&T development, particularly 
in relation to a future Basic Plan for S&T Development. Resources in FNDCT have grown 
year by year and are principally oriented to the physical modernization of the existing 
S&T infrastructure and to the building up of a nucleus of persons that will permit 
adequate utilization of that infrastructure. The Fund is managed by FINEP through 
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transfers to other institutions or. directly by allocations to programs and projects. The 
three principal users of the Fund are the National Development Bank (for FUNTEC, the fund 
it administers), CNPq, and FINEP itself, entities that themselves redistribute those 
resources to the final users. Among the principal beneficiary sectors are, first, the 
educational sector, followed by the industrial sector, directly through programs and pro-
jects for the transformation of industry and indirectly through the development of new 
technologies e.g., (nuclear, space, ocean studies). 
The National Research Council (CNPq) distributes different types of fellowships: 
(a) for new researchers, to allow them to get started on research under the supervision 
of an experienced professor or researcher; (b) for the improvement of researchers, similar 
to (a); (c) for postgraduates, to attain higher degrees (MSc, PhD): these have grown 
considerably, from 18 in 1962 to 1,259 in 1973. Fellowships are given principally for 
training in Brazil, students being sent overseas when they cannot get further training 
of the required quality within the country. Most fellowships are for basic and applied 
research, whereas those for development (technology) are barely over 10% of the total. 
About half of all the fellowships are in medical sciences and agriculture. It is also 
significant that the principal field in overseas fellowships is technology, with 27%. 
The Council also assists institutions that have reasonable conditions for S&T work. 
They are evaluated according to their human potential, and funds are provided for in-
stallations, new equipment, documentation, and various expenses. 
In the early 1950s CAPES started its activity of supporting both training (with 
scholarships for study in Brazil and abroad) and the growth and consolidation of advanced 
training centres, which offered graduate training after 1964. From 1952 to 1972 CAPES 
awarded over 9,000 scholarships and, in addition, it helped 3,000 persons to use scholar-
ships given by other organizations or to undertake short study trips. Its programs for 
the support of graduate institutions and graduate courses are instrumental in the con-
tinuation and improvement of this level of education. 
The Fund for Technological Development (FUNTEC) was created in 1964 with the idea 
of using 40% of its resources for graduate education courses in physics, chemistry, and 
engineering, and 60% for R&D that would help to produce innovations, adapt and improve 
currently used processes, develop processes to utilize domestic natural resources better, 
put out technical standards, etc. The Economic Development Bank could apply resources 
from the Fund for donations, grants, reimbursable loans, and equity participation. Modi-
fications occurred throughout the years: resources were applied to technical training 
and o~her graduate study areas were included (basic sciences, applied sciences, social 
sciences, biological sciences, and later, economics, administration, planning, and 
organization of services). In 1973 the objectives of the Fund were more carefully defined 
as "promoting and supporting, through complementary financial cooperation, the carrying 
out of programmes and projects to enlarge, develop and improve techniques, processes and 
products, and their utilization by the national economy." From this time the Fund 
started to give greater support to technological activities more directly applied to 
industry, and less support to graduate training and basic research. The Fund's Program 
of Technological Development has two subprograms, one for technological research proper 
and the other for the utilization of advanced technology by industry, particularly 
technology generated in the country. 
A precise evaluation of the Fund has not yet been made, but some preliminary 
observations can be made. First, in 1965-73 more than half of the Fund's resources went 
to three institutions: the Universities of Sao Paulo, Rio (Federal), and Rio (Catholic). 
This may be due to a strategy of making up critical mass in some units of the university 
and research system that were capable of carrying out such a strategy. This concen-
tration has aggravated regional imbalances. The need for Bank funds by institutions of 
the educational system shows the deficiencies of this system and raises the question of 
what would happen if the Bank decided to support technological research rather than 
graduate education and basic research. Among FUNTEC users are the military ministries, 
which have been increasing their share in recent years. Thus, S&T problems are receiving 
growing emphasis on grounds of national security and are translated into projects of a 
more technological character than those of the universities. On the other hand, enter-
prises have hardly benefited from the Fund. Since there is good contact between enter-
prises and the Bank, this cannot be attributed to lack of communication; it is perhaps 
due to a preference for technology imports as well as to a decision to carry out research 
- if research is performed - with the help of funds from other sources, possibly for 
reasons of secrecy or to avoid costly project preparation. This situation may not be 
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favourable to a change in emphasis by the Fund toward technology projects. In fact, the 
Fund has found it difficult in recent years to use all its resources on account of a lack 
of projects. 
The Fund has introduced the project as the unit on which decisions are taken: 
this has had a salutary effect on the planning of activities at the beneficiary 
universities. 
Finally, it should be noted that FUNTEC represents only a small share - about 
4% - of the total credit operations of the Development Bank, and furthermore, that this 
is completely covered by resources from FNDCT so that the Bank is not committing any 
resources of its own. This would show that FUNTEC has a rather low priority for the 
Bank, an institution that has traditionally been engaged in financing fixed assets and 
solving bottleneck problems for key industries, but not in building up human and knowledge 
resources. 
FINEP, the funding organization for studies and projects, was created in 1965, 
and through the years its mission has been greatly expanded. Since 1971 it has been the 
Executive Secretariat of the National Fund of Scientific and Technological Development 
(FNDCT), referred to above. FINEP is the orbit of the Planning Ministry and has become 
an instrument for the support of the S&T sector, at the same time retaining its tradi-
tional program of studies and projects and its support to consulting and engineering 
firms. 
The funding of studies and projects is carried out largely with the collaboration 
of a network of state-financing agents, so that the program has acquired a decentralized 
characteristic. The principal users are institutions linked to the sectors of the 
various states in Brazil, which in this way can improve their planning and decision-
making processes, using the services of consulting firms to supplement their often meagre 
qualified manpower. In 1973 some 280 projects were funded, principally related to 
studies of the conditions of the social and economic infrastructure. 
To strengthen consulting firms, which are a vital link between S&T and the 
productive system, FINEP inaugurated in 1973 its Program for the Support of National 
Consulting, which funds physical investments, working capital, and training expenditures 
of consulting firms. 
As manager of FNDCT, FINEP is applying substantial resources to S&T, principally 
with regard to the modernization of the infrastructure and the training of human per-
sonnel who will allow the infrastructure to be utilized. However, application of re-
sources of technology is still moderate, although it is growing. The Fund is managed 
through transfers to other institutions, principally the Economic Development Bank, or 
directly through financing given by FINEP for different programs and projects. In this 
regard FINEP has created a Program of Development of Industrial Technology to stimulate 
domestic industry to create technology through the development of new products and 
processes and to support it in expanding technological capacity in research centres, 
personnel training, etc. 
Some general conclusions about the use of financial instruments may be added: 
(a) The principal direct instruments in S&T policy in Brazil have been financial. 
The Basic Plan for S&T Development has basically consisted of a collection of projects 
suggested by federal institutions. 
(b) Users of financial support are institutions, not persons, which limits the 
number of investors. 
(c) Financial support has been principally directed at the improvement of 
·conditions in the supply of knowledge, and in particular basic, nonapplied scientific 
knowledge. 
(d) Demand for the resources has not been sufficient to employ them fully, and 
the quality of projects has not been fully evaluated because not enough information has 
been asked of the applicants. 
(e) The lack of demand is probably due to organizational and human resource 
difficulties in educational and research institutions, and to the lack of interest on 
the part of enterprises, which prefer to import technology. A contributing factor is 
the limited staff of the institutions that manage the financial mechanisms. 
(f) The instruments for implementing the financial policy - notably the project -
are a means to improve the decision-making proces~ and the organization of educational 
and research institutions. 
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(g) On account of these difficulties there is a large concentration of resources 
in a few institutions, widening the relative imbalances but on the other hand allowing 
the building up of critical masses in the receiving institutions. The trade-off between 
these two effects, however, is not easy to determine. 
PERU 
Funding of S&T in the Public Sector(l 5) 
Peru has a legal instrument (Article 10 of Law 17096/1968) that creates the 
National Research Fund, to be administered by the National Research Council. However 
this instrument of S&T policy has not yet been implemented, even though almost 10 years 
have gone by, because of the many ups and downs suffered by the Council. However, the 
current restructuring of the Council should make it possible to create a mechanism for 
gathering economic resources and allocating them for the support and promotion of S&T 
activities. 
The tendency in Peruvian S&T policy has been to create stable sources of funds 
at the sectoral level, which will not depend on the process of negotiation that governs 
the budgetary allocations of the state and its ministries. The General Laws of Industry, 
Fishing, Mining, and Communications establish percentages of the net income of enter-
prises that are to be devoted to R&D - the figures are 2%, 2%, 1%, and 1% respectively -
which has opened the possibility of about 10 times more resources being devoted to R&D 
than was the case in the early 1970s. 
The mechanisms that the ministries have established to implement their S&T policy 
with the help of these funds principally work on the supply of S&T and on the training of 
human resources, save in the case of industry, where the Institute of Industrial Tech-
nological Research and Technical Standards (ITINTEC) is also attempting to generate demand 
for R&D and other S&T services in the productive enterprises. The administrative load 
involved in the efficient administration of these funds is very heavy. The identification, 
selection, evaluation, and control of research projects require highly qualified per-
sonnel, and with some exceptions such personnel is not available in the ministerial 
staffs. 
It is in the sphere of the Ministry of Industry that use of this type of fund 
has gone furthest as a way of implementing the sectoral S&T policy. The organization in 
charge of this - ITINTEC, which was created in lg72 - has been able to develop policy 
guidelines and to establish a detailed mechanism for that purpose. Research programs can 
be carried out by the enterprises themselves, individually or collectively, or can be 
contracted out to research centres. Programs are approved and controlled by ITINTEC. If 
the firm does not use its 2%, this amount goes to ITINTEC, which may then apply it to 
support other programs of its own. This flexibility in project execution allows the 
incorporation of more universities and other research centres, linking them up with the 
productive sector. It also allows S&T capacity to be enlarged through the channeling 
of projects to universities and the acquisition of equipment and installations that did 
not exist in the country. 
ITINTEC has established criteria for the approval of projects and programs of 
research that are principally based on the objectives sought through industrial tech-
nological research. At the same time ITINTEC takes into account the priority criteria 
established in the Industrial Development Plan of the Ministry of Industry, and the cost-
benefit analyses of program proposals presented by the enterprises. 
From the time ITINTEC took up its functions until lg75, a total of 353 projects 
had been presented, of which 215 had been authorized for a total amount of 324 million 
sols; 89 more projects were presented for 1975, for 236 million sols. Of this, 44% was 
for the food and the chemical branches, which are directed toward the more urgent needs 
of Peruvian society, and the rest was distributed in metal-mechanics, electronics, 
textiles, electricity, construction, and metallurgy. 
Among the drawbacks of this set-up is the fact that large enterprises stand to 
profit more than small ones, because resources at their disposal may allow them to set 
up programs of a sufficient size to be efficient and significant. A further drawback is 
the question of ownership of results, which presents a difficult legal problem. Another 
question is the definition of R&D, which, if very strict, would mean that many programs 
would not qualify. However, in this respect ITINTEC has adopted a flexible approach 
44 
and has allowed many important S&T activities to profit from the powerful funding mech-
anism it administers. 
MEXICO 
Federal Funds for S&T( 17 l 
The National S&T Council (CONACYT) was created in 1971, and shortly thereafter it 
started to channel additional resources to research institutions, programs of human 
resource training, and technical cooperation programs. This was done, however, without a 
general frame of reference regarding sectoral priorities, quantitative goals, and policy 
criteria. A first attempt to rationalize this situation led to the establishment of 
"indicative programs" that were to link research efforts with national development goals, 
with the participation of government organizations, higher-education institutions, and 
users of R&D. The Council was to contribute financial and administrative resources to 
these programs for the achievement of objectives jointly defined by the scientific 
community and the users of R&D. However, administrative changes toward the end of 1972 
did not allow the programs to function, with the exception of the one on food. 
Later on, a new administration within the Council gave considerable support to the 
indicative programs, which were taken to be one of the most important mechanisms of CONACYT. 
CONACYT. Between 1973 and 1976 some 13 programs were designed and started (food, demography, 
tropical ecology, education, health, agricultural development, pharmaceuticals, ocean 
resources, mineral resources, meteorology, seismology, basic sciences, strengthening and 
creation of new research centres). 
On the other hand, the Council is empowered to channel additional resources to 
academic institutions or research centres for the promotion and execution of studies 
around specific programs and projects. In 1974 the policy on the channeling of resources 
was defined thus: "CONACYT should support scientific and technological research by means 
of additional resources but it cannot be the main source of funds within the S&T system. 
The Council should have a limited participation, since the important thing is that it 
should act on the system fundamentally through the formulation of plans and programmes 
orienting and not centralizing the efforts of the country on matters of science and 
technology." Only a sma 11 part of the resources the state devotes to research are 
channeled through CONACYT (11% to 15%), and the purpose is to orient the action of the 
S&T system by applying these resources at strategic points in the system. 
The question is whether it is possible to orient new research toward economic 
development objectives with such a low proportion of additional resources (note that one-
fourth of the funds at the disposal of CONACYT are spent on administration). This 
question is particularly important because the structure of Mexico's S&T system corres-
ponds to what has been termed the pluralistic model, in which decisions related to S&T 
are taken in an isolated manner by different agencies and departments without any overall 
coordination. The different research centres and institutes that operate in Mexico are 
more or less independent decision centres; among other factors, ministerial control over 
some centres, entrenched interests in others, and the important question of university 
autonomy make it difficult to coordinate the components of the S&T system. 
At present the Council attempts to deal with this situation by formulating a 
general framework for S&T policy that will allow it to set up priorities to guide 
resource allocation according to quantitative goals in the medium and long term. To do 
this the Council has created two organs, one of them for integrating the federal R&D 
budget according to the framework established by the Indicative S&T Plan, the other for 
policy formulation. Time will show whether this system of policymaking and budget 
formulation will be successful; the experience of other organizations similar to CONACYT 
(such as TUBITAK in Turkey}, and the experience of CONACYT during its first few years, 
have not been too encouraging. 
JAPAN 
State Financing of Scientific and Technical Activities(lB) 
The system of state financing of research in Japan began quite early, in 1918, 
with the subsidies to science started by the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, this 
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policy instrument, as an independent tool, was to acquire full importance only after 
World War II, and even more so after 1960. Up to the War, the main thrust of government 
policy was on the importation of technology and direct government intervention in the 
generation of technology for war purposes. After World War II, the key development was 
to be the importation of technology coupled with large "digestive'' R&D expenses, parti-
cularly through the activities of key engineering and consulting services, which in turn 
promoted the demand for indigenously developed technologies (peripheral technologies and 
some modular ones). 
Under those conditions it became necessary to enlarge and rationalize state 
support for science and technology. The first move in that direction was the creation 
in 1950 of a system of subsidies to private firms, under the institution in charge of 
screening foreign technology: the Agency for Industrial Science and Technology (AIST). 
The volume of funds channeled through these subsidies was not very large from 1950 to 
1970: only $39 million was allocated for a total of 3,400 items. In addition to the 
system of subsidies, AIST used other means for supporting the development of Japanese 
technologies, closely associated with its advisory role in screening foreign technology. 
These means were the direct financial assistance given to Japanese firms interested in 
applied research and the advice given to the Japan Development Bank (the financial arm 
of MITI) about the convenience of favourable credits to firms whose production was based 
on nationally developed technologies. 
At the beginning of the 1960s a substantially different institutional set-up for 
financing scientific and technological activities had to be created. The continuous 
growth of Japanese industries could not rely entirely on imported technologies if Japan 
was to engage in large-scale competition in the world market. Moreover, there could be 
no further digestion of foreign technology if the relation between the scientific and 
technological infrastructure and industrial technology was not substantially intensified, 
particularly at the level of industrial firms. The governmental infrastructure was 
relatively well developed, especially since AIST took over the centralized administration 
of a number of large research institutions. AIST had channeled industrial demand toward 
these institutions during the period of predominantly imported technology. The problems 
were elsewhere: in the insufficient financial resources for the development of tech-
nologies by industry itself. Foreign suppliers were increasingly reluctant to sell tech-
nology to potential competitors, and were charging higher prices and imposing stiffer 
conditions (restrictive business practices). 
It is implicit in the very character of the institutions created in Japan at that 
time that the country considered financing as the key factor in the development of more 
fruitful relationships between the scientific and technical infrastructure and industry. 
In 1961 the Japanese Research and Development Corporation (JRDC) was founded, attached 
to AIST and with the specific purpose of providing risk capital for scientific and 
technical activities. 
However, JRDC did not limit itself to the provision of risk capital. It also 
considered it necessary that active promotional activities should go along with the 
provision of funds. In fact, the Corporation carefully selects those activities of basic 
or applied research being undertaken at universities, research institutions, or by 
individuals that may offer possibilities of being developed into industrial processes or 
products with sales perspectives. Once having identified such potential developments, 
JRDC makes an open call to various related firms, suggesting that they themselves assume 
the responsibility for the development work needed, including the construction of pilot 
plants of prototypes at the industrial level. JRDC then selects the most suitable firm 
or firms and finances the entire cost of the development project. As with all forms of 
risk capital, funds are not returnable if the development work is not successful. On the 
other hand, if the results are positive, funds have to be returned on a long-term basis, 
but (and this is not a common feature of risk capital) bearing no interest. 
The JRDC literature describes the procedure that a firm has to follow to get a 
development research contract in these terms: 
(a) Detailed study of the development project. 
(b) Determination of the financial assistance to be advanced by the corporation 
and its method of payment. 
(c) Licencing and other protective measures. 
(d) The setting of standards to determine the success or failure of the project. 
(e) Determination of royalties and method of payment. 
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If the results are positive, both the proprietor of the original research and 
JRDC are to receive a previously agreed royalty rate. During the first 10 years of 
experience of the JRDC fund, over 100 risk capital loans had been granted. Of these, 
55 had finished the development work in that period, with a success rate of go%. Such a 
high success rate now makes it possible for JRDC to obtain 50% of the necessary financing 
from its own income (returns and royalties). 
It should be remembered that all these forms of financing constitute direct 
government support of industrial R&D and do not include the substantial financing given 
to the many research institutes and associations in Japan, most of them directly depend-
ing on a ministry. By the end of the period under examination, new forms of financing 
were becoming necessary. The aggressive penetration of world markets and protection 
vis-a-vis foreign competition at home (regulations concerning foreign investment had been 
liberalized) could only be secured by Japan becoming the chief innovator in certain 
fields. Also, the basic problems of energy and pollution had acquired much greater 
importance. 
An institution was created in 1966 for the specific purpose of confronting these 
problems. Its need emerged out of the period being examined and its characteristics are 
worth examining. 
This institution is the National Research and Development Programs System (NRDPS). 
This System consists of direct government financing of R&D with carefully programed 
objectives. Urgent projects are selected where the spontaneous market forces do not 
provide the necessary incentives, because the urgent projects require a great deal of 
financing and a long period for their completion, as well as involving considerable risks. 
This System is also under AIST. About 40 persons administer its application 
through wide consultations with official technology agencies, research institutions, 
bureaux of various ministries, and industrialists; such a consultation process provides 
the basis for selecting the projects and programs that will compose the System. Certain 
social criteria are used to establish priorities, such as the effect on the use of 
natural resources and on environmental pollution, and the contribution to economic deve-
lopment and industrial efficiency. 
Projects in NRDPS are finally evaluated according to costs, duration, required 
resources, and estimated quantitative results when applied at an industrial level. The 
availability of objective criteria for the evaluation of results and the guarantee of its 
potential application in Japan (that is, the availability in Japan of the necessary means 
and resources for its industrial application) are both prerequisites for approval of the 
project. The system is entirely administered by AIST: it signs the contracts, commis-
sions the execution of specific projects with industrial firms or laboratories, and 
appoints a director for each project. Every 6 months the project is reexamined, and 
after the results have been obtained, AIST secures the financing and promotion for the 
industrialization of the results through the intermediate of MIT!. 
Of the nine projects approved between 1966 and 1971, only one had been cancelled 
due to a revision of the cost estimate. Most of the projects being long term, no infor-
mation is yet available for an evaluation of the results. 
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Table l: Institution Building in Korea 
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Table 2: Dae Duk Science Town in Korea 
New Institution Functions 
Shipbuilding Industry Technical Services To support the fast-expanding Korean ship-
building industry and relieve the foreign 
currency drain due to the purchase of tech-
nological know-how and construction plans. 
Ocean Research and Development Institute To establish a core for the survey and dis-
semination of data on marine resources such 
as minerals, fish, tideland, etc. 
Electronic Communications Research To promote standardization and local manu-
Institute facturing of communications equipment, tech-
nology import, and manpower training; also, 
to develop a high-speed, high-capacity 
transmission systems. 
Petroleum Institute To solve technological problems in energy 
petroleum products supply, as well as in 
petrochemical industries, and to have self-
sufficient technical capability to digest 
the imported technology. 
Mechanical Engineering Research Institute To solve problems in casting industries, to 
develop design and high-quality machining 
technology, and to develop die-making 
technology. 
*Relocated institutions 
1. National Industrial Standards Research Institute 
2. National Geological Mining Research Institute 
3. National Agricultural Products Inspection Office 
4. National Inst1tute for Agricultural Materials 
5. National Agricultural Products Experimental Office 
6. Central Fisheries Products Inspection Office 
7. Food Research Institute 
8. Central Monopoly Research Institute 
9. Technical Research Institute of Office of Tax Administration 
10. Railroad Technology Research Institute 
11. Electricity and Telecommunication Laboratory 
12. National Institute of Health 
*Service Institutions 
1. Administrative Office 
2. Library Information Centre 
3. Computer Centre 
4. Workshop and Maintenance Centre 
5. Analysis and Testing Laboratory 
6. Science Centre 




(l) R. Maheu, National science policies in countries of south and southeast Asia, 
Paris, UNESCO, 1965. 
(2) This tendency toward institutional imitation has been responsible for several 
deficiencies found in Peruvian institutions, particularly in the fields of health 
care, higher education, industrial development, and even science and technology. 
(3) A. Araoz and M. Kamenetzky, Projectos de inversion en ciencia y tecnolog1a, 
Buenos Aires, Centro de Investigaciones en Administraci6n Publica, 1975. 
(4) One of the advantages of a close cooperation between small countries (such as 
those in Central America or the Caribbean) is that through a common S&T policy at 
the subregional level it may be possible to complement national efforts to attain 
a complete spectrum. A good example is the University of the West Indies, with 
four campuses in four English-speaking Caribbean countries, which between them 
cover the scientific fields of more relevance to these countries. 
(5) INTI material supplied by the Argentinian STPI team. 
(6) Source: S&T Plan, 1974-79, section 3.18. 
(7) Source: Second PBDCT 
(8) Another very important effort of institution building is to take place in connec-
tion with nuclear research and its applications, with German cooperation. 
(9) Source: Reports by the Peruvian STPI team. 








This approach has been followed in practice by countries as varied as Brazil, India, 
Mexico, Egypt, Korea, Colombia, and Venezuela. 
For a more complete treatment, and for the different national reports on which the 
summaries of the country experiences are based, see F. Sagasti and A. Araoz 
(editors), Science and technology for development: planning in the STPI countries, 







Reports on Phase II by the Korean STPI team. 
Reports by the Colombian STPI team. 
Document No. 2 by the Brazilian STPI team, and the Second PBDCT. 
Reports by the Peruvian STPI team. 
Chapter l of A. Nadal, Instrumentos de pol1tica cient1fica y tecnologica, 
El Colegio de Mexico, 1976. 
(18) Source: S. Barrio and F. Sagasti, Technological policies of postwar Japan: a 













INSTITUTES AND COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING 
IN THE STPI PROJECT 
Secretaria Ejecutiva del Consejo Latinoamericano de 
Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO) 
Country Coordinator: Eduardo Amadeo 
Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos (FINEP) 
Country Coordinator: Fabio Erber (until September 1974) 
and Jose Tavares 
Fondo Colombiano de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Proyectos Especiales "Francisco Jose de Caldas" 
( COLC I ENC !AS) 
Country Coordinator: Fernando Chaparro 
Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Adel Sabet (until July 1975) and 
Ahmed Gamal Abdel Samie 
National Committee on Science and Technology 
Country Coordinator: Anil Malhotra (until June 1975) 
and S.K. Subramanian (until March 1976) 
The Korea Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) 
Country Coordinator: KunMo Chung 
El Colegio de Mexico 
Country Coordinator: Alejandro Nadal 
Instituto Nacional de Planificacion (!NP) 
Country Coordinator: Enrique Estremadoyro (until 
February 1975) and Fernando Otero 
Technical Directors: Fernando Gonzales Vigil (until 
February 1975) and Roberto Wangeman 
Consejo N.acional de Investigaciones Cientificas y 
Tecnologicas (CONICIT) 
Country Coordinator: Dulce de Uzcategui (until July 
1974) and Ignacio Avalos 
Faculty of Economics, University of Skopje 
Country Coordinator: tlikola Kljusev 
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Appendix 2 
SURVEY OF THE COUNTRY TEAM'S WORK 
The organization, composition, and orientation of each of the country teams 
reflected the own interests and those of the institutions that hosted them, always 
within the framework of the STPI project concerns. A brief review of the approach and 
the work of each team may help to place the STPI project and the comparative reports 
in perspective. To complete the survey, a description of the field coordinator's of-
fice work is given. 
ARGENTINA: The initial location for the Argentine team was the Department of Econom-
ics of the Catholic University. However, after some months, the university decided 
to withdraw its application and the country coordinator moved to the Argentine branch 
of the executive secretariat of the Latin American Social Science Council (CLACSO). The 
team was headed by Eduardo Amadeo, an economist, and two other members were appointed 
to work full time on the project. An advisory committee of several researchers and 
policymakers active in science and technology policy was formed. To carry out the re-
search, the team relied on consultants who wrote reports on specific subjects that were 
integrated into a final report. 
A significant change took place when the country coordinator was named 
president of the Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Industrial (INTI), the national 
industrial technology institute, which is the largest and most important industrial re-
search organization in Argentina. Mr Amadeo never relinquished his formal role as co-
ordinator; after 6 months, he left his new post and resumed his position as country co-
ordinator. Because most of the work was well under way, his absence did not substan-
tially alter the team's pace, although the preparation of the Argentine synthesis report 
was postponed. Part of the team's work was reoriented to be most useful to the co-
ordinator in his new position. 
The Argentines focused on two branches of industry - machine tools and petro-
chemicals - but studied many broader issues. For instance, the reports include a docu-
ment on the technological content of the 3-year development plan (1974-77), a study of 
the Argentine industrial structure, a description and brief analysis of technology pol-
icy instruments in Argentina, a study of the system for regulating technology imports, 
and several short reports on international technical assistance as an instrument of tech-
nology policy. 
The structure of the Argentine scientific and technological system was studied 
in detail, as were the conditions under which it could be made more responsive to 
industry's needs. The Argentines covered the public sector, examining the possible role 
of the public sector as promoter of scientific and technological development. Detailed 
studies were carried out at two enterprises: one in charge of generating electricity 
in Buenos Aires (SEGBA) and the other in charge of generating and distributing gas for 
household and industrial consumption. Other contributions of the Argentine team were 
a study of the emergence and development of engineering and consulting firms in the 
chemical process industries, a detailed analysis of two research centres within the 
national industrial technology institute (INTI), and two short papers on capital accumu-
lation and on the crisis of capitalism. 
The Argentine team followed the methods guidelines; however, they produced a 
series of thematic reports on issues of actual and potential interest to ·policymakers 
in the country, coinciding with the themes selected for study in STPI. 
BRAZIL: The Brazilian team was hosted at the research group of the Financiadora de 
Estudos e Projetos (FINEP), the state agency in charge of financing studies for invest-
ment projects and also the executive arm of the national fund for scientific and tech-
nological development. The first coordinator was the director of the research group, 
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Fabio Erber. When he took a leave of absence from FINEP in September 1974, he was 
replaced by Jose Tavares, the new head of the research group. The group at FINEP had 
been carrying out research on science and technology policy for some time, and the STPI 
assignment was one of its tasks for 1973-76. Practically all of the work was done by 
members of the FINEP research group, although two or three reports were contracted to 
professionals outside FINEP. 
From the beginning, the Brazilians decided to concentrate on the role of state 
enterprises in technology policy. They chose branches of industry that were dominated 
by state enterprises (oil and petrochemicals, steel, and electricity), conducting de-
tailed interviews, analyzing existing data, and testing hypotheses systematically to 
cover issues such as the selection of equipment and processes, the purchase of 
engineering services, the performance of research and development, and the planning 
activities at these state enterprises. 
In addition to the new material generated by the Brazilian team during STPI, 
several reports based on past research carried out by FINEP were made available to the 
STPI network. These included background reports on the organization and structure of 
the Brazilian science and technology system, a study on the machine tool industry, a 
report on the demand for services of 12 research institutes, and a background report on 
industrial policies in Brazil during the last 2 decades. 
In parallel with the work for STPI, the FINEP team was also engaged in a re-
search project on the diffusion of technical innovations in three industrial branches 
{pulp and paper, cement, and textiles) and they agreed to put their results at the 
disposal of the STPI network as an additional contribution. 
The Brazilian team used the guidelines only as a general reference, given that 
most of their work went along different lines from those originally envisaged for the 
project. Nevertheless, the richness and variety of their material effectively upgraded 
the comparative reports. 
COLOMBIA: No Colombian participant was present at the initial organizing meeting, and 
the Colombian application to join the STPI network was received later arid formally 
accepted at the Rio meeting of the coordinating committee. The team was hosted by the 
Colombian Council for Science and Technology, COLC I ENC IAS, and was headed by a socio log-
i st, Fernando Chaparro. In spite of joining the STPI network late, the Colombian team 
caught up with the pace of work and finished all its work by the deadline. 
COLCIENCIAS organized a special team with five members who devoted practically 
all their time to research in STPI. Several other consultants were also asked to pre-
pare reports on issues of specific interest such as selected policy instruments. For 
example, a study was commissioned on the impact of tariff mechanisms; a report was pre-
pared on the influence of price controls; and a preliminary analysis of the possible 
use of the state's purchasing power as an instrument of technology policy was also pre-
pared. The branches chosen for study were all linked to agriculture: fertilizers and 
pesticides, agricultural machinery, and food processing, taking into consideration the 
interests of Colombian policymakers as perceived by the team. In these branch studies, 
the methods guidelines were cJosely followed. 
Other reports prepared by the Colo~bian team include a study of science and 
technology planning, an analysis of implicit industrial technology policies, a conceptual 
framework for the study of consulting and engineering organizations, a series of reports 
on industrial branches based on discussions with panels of experts, a study of science 
and technology policies in the agricultural sector (to complement the analysis done for 
industry), and two essays on the process of industrialization in Colombia and its techno-
logical implications. 
Five groups of policy instruments were studied in detail, and their impact on 
each branch was examined through interviews at various enterprises. All of the findings 
were integrated into the final report of the Colombian team. 
EGYPT: Although an Egyptian representative participated in the initial deliberations 
leading to the STPI project, it was not possible to organize the team to carry out 
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research and prepare inputs for the international comparison. There were several admin-
istrative difficulties and staffing problems that prevented the organization of a work-
ing team. The host institution was the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology 
and the first coordinator was Adel Sabet, who was replaced by Gamal A. Samie in July 
1975. The Egyptian team presented papers that were personal contributi"ons based on 
past experience rather than the result of research carried out by a team; and research 
was not begun at the academy until the second half of 1976. 
INDIA: The host organization in India was the National Committee on Science and Tech-
nology, and the first coordinator was Anil Malhotra, who was replaced in June 1975 by 
S.K. Subramanian. Mr Subramanian resigned in March 1976, and no one replaced him. No 
funds were requested to set up a country team in India, and the Indians provided back-
ground material that had already been collected as background for a new science and tech-
nology plan. 
Three background documents were distributed along with the final S & T plan to 
all the teams in STPI. In addition, a report on foreign collaboration, a note on 
science and technology planning in India, a survey of engineering consultancy services, 
a report on the development of the electronics industry, and two papers on small-scale 
industries and technology transfer were distributed by the Indian coordinator. No em-
pirical research was done following the methods guidelines, and the Indian contribution 
to the comparative reports reflects this. 
SOUTH KOREA: The South Korean team was one of the first to be organized and was esta-
lished at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science, KAIS, as part of the activities of 
its science, technology, and society program. KunMo Chung was named country coordinator 
and the team consisted of five other members. All but one of them had other academic 
duties and could allocate only a portion of their time to STPI research. Then, Graham 
Jones was hired to advise in the preparation of the report for phase 1. 
The South Korean team advanced rapidly and completed its work in time for the 
Sussex workshop, following the methods guidelines and introducing modifications only 
where necessary. Two reports were produced corresponding to the requirements for phases 
1 and 2 of the project. 
The branches chosen for study were electronics, petrochemicals, and powder 
metallurgy, and a report was prepared for each one. In addition, the team prepared 
documents on engineering services and industrialization in South Korea, on the Korean 
Institute of Science and Technology, on transfer of technology in the electronics indus-
try, on the interface between the science and technology plan and the economic develop-
ment plan, and on state enterprises in technical development. 
Although most of the work was done by the team located at KAIS, consultants 
were asked to deal with specifics. The team predominantly represented engineering and 
physical sciences, but an economist who was a senior government official, helped to 
relate the results to South Korean policymakers and to balance the other team members' 
biases. 
MEXICO: The Mexican team was among the first to start working in STPI and was located 
~Colegio de Mexico, an academic and social research and graduate training organiza-
tion. Alejandro Nadal was country coordinator and there were four other members of the 
team who worked full time on STPI. The Mexican team initially followed the guidelines 
rather closely and was one of the first in suggesting modifications and changes as a 
result of contrasting concepts with preliminary research findings. In particular, the 
team found it difficult to interpret the results of interviews in enterprises using the 
schema proposed to study technological behaviour. The branches chosen for detailed 
study were capital goods, food processing, and petrochemicals. 
A background report on the structure and evolution of the Mexican scientific 
and technological system was prepared, together with a description of the industrial-
ization process and of agricultural development. Documents on particular subjects 
included a report on engineering firms, a study of the technology policy of PEMEX (the 
state oil monopoly), and progress reports dealing with hypotheses on the impact of policy 
instruments on technical behaviour at the enterprise level, a description of policy ins-
truments in Mexico, etc. 
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Most of the findings of the Mexican team were integrated into the main final 
report, part of which was delivered at the coordinating committee in New Delhi (January 
1976) and the rest at the Sussex workshop (June 1976). The work of the Mexican team 
covered practically all the research topics considered in STPI, and its contribution 
to the comparative report reflects this. The Mexican report was published in Spanish 
in 1977 and was awarded second prize in a contest for the best works in economics. 
For various reasons, the Mexican team chose to limit its direct interaction 
with policymakers and followed its own research program. Results were made available 
to policymakers in the form of draft reports, and through the participation of the coor-
dinator in one of the committees established to prepare the Mexican plan for science 
and technology. 
PERU: The Peruvian team was established within the research group of the National 
Planning Institute. A series of administrative difficulties affected the progress of 
the team, including a change of technical director, when Fernando Gonzales Vigil was 
replaced by Roberto Wangeman in February 1975. Approximately two-thirds of the research 
was completed in time for the Sussex workshop. 
From the beginning, the team decided to adopt a sectorial approach to the re-
search. Efforts were focused on the study of industrial branches connected with the 
extraction and processing of minerals and with the provision of machinery for the mining 
industry. The steel industry was also studied, ~1ith emphasis on the state enterprise 
in charge of the largest steelworks. This meant that the guidelines were used primarily 
in sectorial studies and in the analysis of policy instruments. 
Background reports on the situation of the scientific and technological system 
and on the evolution of Peruvian industry were prepared following the general framework 
put forward in the guidelines. In addition to these and the sectorial reports, the team 
prepared other documents, dealing with issues such as explicit and implicit science and 
technology policies, consulting and engineering capabilities, the possible use of state 
enterprises as instruments of technology, and the governement administrative machinery 
for science and technology policy. 
The Peruvian team was located within an official government organization, but 
its direct impact on policymaking is difficult to assess because it took the form of 
daily contact with government officials. On the basis of the sectorial reports on mining, 
a committee has been set up to review the findings of the STPI team. 
VENEZUELA: The Venezuelan team was hosted by the national council of science and tech-
nology (CONICIT) and was among the first to start working. The team was initially 
dominated by sociologists, although economists increased their participation at later 
stages. The first coordinator, Dulce de Uzcategui, was replaced by Luis Matos, who was 
soon followed by Ignacio Avalos. Three other members worked full time, and the team 
was biased toward sociology and economics. 
They progressed through two stages punctuated by a change in government. In 
the first stage, most of the background reports corresponding to phases 1 and 2 of the 
STPI methods were prepared, covering the science and technology, the political, the 
educational, and the economic systems. These reports were made obsolete by the change 
in government. In the second stage, the team tried to adjust to the new situation, 
repeating some of the earlier studies and continuing the research. However, the orga-
nization of a national congress on science and technology, which mobilized all the 
staff working at CONICIT, affected the team's progress. 
The branches chosen for study were capital goods, electronics, and petrochemi-
cals. In addition, reports were written on specific issues such as the governement 
organizational structure for science and technology policy, instruments for industrial 
science and technology policy, economic and financial policy instruments and their im-
pact on technology, the purchase of capital goods in two industrial branches, and the 
relations between the financial system and technology policy. The Venezuelan team 
concluded its research shortly after the Sussex workshop. 
The fact that the Venezuelan team was located in a government agency that took 
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a very active role in science and technology policy after the change in government 
created both opportunities and problems. As a result of the new tasks undertaken by 
CONICIT, the pace and continuity of the STPI work was frequently altered. On the other 
hand, there was more possibility for actively contributing to policymaking. The Vene-
zuelan contribution to the comparative reports reflects this situation. 
YUGOSLAVIA (MACEDONIA): The Macedonian team was organized at the faculty of economics 
of the University of Skopje. A senior faculty member, Nikola Kljusev, was appointed 
coordinator. The team was composed of a very large number of faculty members and re-
searchers who devoted part of their time to STPI. The tasks were subdivided and indi-
vidual reports requested from various members of the team, although at a later stage 
two team members were asked to work full time on STPI. 
The Macedonian team did not follow the guidelines, except in the preparation 
of a background report for phase 1. Individual reports were submitted on issues of 
interest to the STPI network, covering topics such as the problems of research and 
development in industrial enterprises, aspects of science and technology policy in Yu-
goslavia, the metallurgical industry in Macedonia, and the growth of engineering firms 
in Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian team's specificity is reflected in their relatively limited 
contribution to the comparative reports. At any rate, given the high degree of partic-
ipation of professionals at all levels in policymaking in the Yugoslav self-managed 
economy, it is rather difficult to assess their contribution toward policymaking in 
conventional terms. 
THE FIELD COORDINATOR'S OFFICE: In August 1973, at the first meeting of the coordi-
nating committee, Francisco Sagasti was appointed field coordinator of the project and 
his office was established shortly thereafter and began operating in a limited way. 
Staffing was completed in April 1974 with the addition of two members. 
The field coordinator's office was independent from the teams and was not 
engaged directly in empirical research. It offered organizational and technical support 
and contracted consultants to prepare reports on topics defined by the coordinating 
committee. 
The field coordinator, first, drew up methods guidelines for phases 1 and 2 
of the project. Background reports on technology policy in China, on technological 
dependence/self-reliance, on science and technology planning, on technology policies in 
Japan, and on technology transfer were also prepared, either by staff members of the 
field coordinator's office or by consultants. The guidelines for phases 3 and 4 of the 
project were prepared jointly by the field coordinator and a consultant. The office 
also organized the Sussex workshop and drafted the comparative reports. The field coor-
dinator was also active in the board of the Peruvian Industrial Technology Institute 
(ITINTEC). 
With the exception of the teams that were engaged in science and technology 
policy research as part of the activities of their institutions (the Brazilian and 
South Korean teams, for example), the teams were dismantled after the STPI project was 
completed. The field coordinator's office was closed in December 1976, and the compara-
tive reports were prepared during 1977-1978, although some teams had not finished their 
work by April 1978. Even though most teams had concluded their STPI activities by the 
end of 1977, this does not mean that the team members left the field of S & T policy 
research and that their effort in STPI was not followed up. What was dismantled, as 
planned from the beginning, was the formal structure of the STPI project. The network 
of personal contacts remains in operation and most of the former team members are active 
in the field of science and technology policy, carrying the experience accumulated in 
STPI to their new positions. 
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Key to STPI Publications 
Primary 
( 1) The STPI Project 
(2) Methodological Guidelines 
(3) Main Comparative Report 
(4) Plann ing 








(22) El INTI en la lndustria Argentina 
(23) El Sector Maquinas Herramientas en 
la Argentina 
(24) Los lnstrumentos de Politica Cientifica 
y Tecnologica en Argentina 
(25) Brazilian Mach ine-Tool Industry 
(26) Los Bancos y Comercializacion de 
Tecnologia 
(27) La lndustria Petroquimica 
(28) La Variable Tecnologica y las 
Variables Horizontales 
(29) Indian Electronics Industry 
Modules 
(6) S& T: Differing Schools of Thought 
(7) Evolution of Industry 
(8) Evolution of S& T 
(9) S& T - Present Status 
(10) Policy & Generation of Technology 
(11) Policy for Imports 
(12) Policy for Technology Demand 
(13) Policy to Promote Industrial S&T 
(14) Policy for Industrial S&T Support 
(15) Industrial Technical Changes 
(16) Industrial Technology Behaviour 
(17) Technical Change Studies 
Selections 
(18) S& T Policy & Development 
(19) Engineering Consulting & Design in 
LDCs 
(20) Technology Transfer in LDCs 
(21) State Enterprises & Technological 
Development 
A GUIDE TO THE 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
(STPI) PUBLICATIONS 
A. Primary Publications 
(1) The Science and Technology Policy Instruments ( STPI) Project (IDRC-050e) (out of print) 
(2) Science and Technology Policy Implementation in Less-Developed Countries: Methodological Guidelines 
for the STPI Project (IDRC-067 e) (out of print) 
(3) Science and Technology for Development Main Comparative Report of the STPI Project (IDRC-109e). 
(Also available in French (IDRC-109f) and Spanish (IDRC-109s).) 
(4) Science and Technology for Development Planning in STPI Countries (IDRC-133e) 
(5) Science and Technology for Development Technology Policy and Industrialization in the People's Republic 
of China (IDRC-130e) 
B. Modules 
These constitute the third part of (3) above and provide supporting material for the findings described and the 
assertions made in ( 3 ). 
(6) STPI Module 1: A Review of Schools of Thought on Science, Technology, Development, and Technical 
Change (IDRC-TSl Se) 
(7) STPI Module 2: The Evolution oflndustry in STPI Countries (IDRC-TS19e) 
(8) STPI Module 3: The Evolution of Science and Technology in STPI Countries (IDRC-TS20e) 
(9) STPI Module 4: The Present Situation of Science and Technology in the STPI Countries (IDRC-TS22e) 
( 10) STPI Module 5: Policy Instruments to Build up an Infrastructure for the Generation of Technology (IDRC-
TS26e) 
(11) STPI Module 6: Policy Instruments for the Regulation of Technology Imports (IDRC-TS33e) 
( 12) STPI Module 7: Policy Instruments to Define the Pattern of Demand for Technology (IDRC-TS27 e) 
(13) STPI Module 8: Policy Instruments to Promote the Performance of S and T Activities in Industrial 
Enterprises (IDRC-TS28e) 
(14) STPI Module 9: Policy Instruments for the Support of Industrial Science and Technology Activities 
(IDRC-TS29e) 
(15) STPI Module 10: Technical Changes in Industrial Branches (IDRC-TS31e) 
( 16) STPI Module 11: Technology Behaviour of Industrial Enterprises (IDRC-TS32e) 
(17) STPI Module 12: Case Studies on Technical Change (IDRC-TS34e) 
C. Selections 
These are a selection of the numerous reports prepared for the STPI Project chosen as a representative sample of 
the ·various topics covered by the STPI Project in the course of the main research effort on policy design and 
implementation. 
Science and Technology for Development A Selection of Background Papers for the Main Comparative Report 
(18) Part A; Science and Technology Policy and Development (IDRC-MR21) 
(19) Part B: Consulting and Design Engineering Capabilities in Developing Countries (IDRC-MR22) 
(20) Part C: Technology Transfer in Developing Countries (IDRC-MR23) 
(21) Part D: State Enterprises and Technological Development (IDRC-MR24) 
D. Background Papers 
(22) El INTI y el Desarrollo Tecnologico en la lndustria Argentina (In press) 
(23) El Sector Maquinas Herramientas en la Argentina (In press) 
(24) Los Instrumentos de Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica en Argentina (In press) 
(25) The Brazilian Machine-Tool Industry: Patterns of Technological Transfer and the Role of the Government 
(In press) 
(26) Roi de los Bancos en la Comercializacion de Tecnologia (In press) 
(27) Comportamiento Tecnologico de las Empresas Mixtas en la lndustria Petroquimica (In press) 
(28) Interrelacion Entre la Variable Tecnologica y las Variables Horizontales: Comercio Exterior, Financia-
miento e Inversion (In press) 
(29) A Planned Approach for the Growth of the Electronics Industry - A Case Study for India (In press) 
E. Country Reports 
(30) Instruments of Science and Technology Policy in Mexico (In press) 
(31) Technology and Industrial Development in Korea (In press) 
(32) Los Instrumentos de Politica Cientifica y Tecnologica en el Peru: Sintesis Final (In press) 
(33) STPI Country Report for Colombia (In press) 


